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Abstract
Differential pricing of air transportation plays an important role in the current theories of
airline seat inventory management. The ability to recognize those passengers willing to "sell
up". or pay more for a seat on a given flight is also important, yet it has received little research
attention. The proper detection and booking management of these passenger types can allow
air carriers to realize higher flight revenues.
This dissertation begins with an overview of airline pricing policies and seat inventory control
management practices. Current fare structures and fare class designations are described in
detail. Airline demand and consumer utility measures are then presented. Consumer behavior
during the booking process. particularly in relation to sell up behavior, is discussed. Price
elasticities of demand also play an important role in the prediction of sell up behavior.
An in-depth description of sell up and its measurement follow. Once specific flights have
been identified as having sell up potential, a sell up strategy can be implemented. Methods of
testing the revenue benefits/costs of a particular sell up strategy were developed and used in
an actual airline environment. A study consisting of a preliminary sell up test followed by an
expanded study incorporating different sell up strategies was performed. Revenue results of the
sell up strategies are presented and the impacts of each policy are discussed. Price elasticities
of demand were estimated for individual fare classes. In general, sell up was found to be flight
specific and more prevalent in the highest two fare classes (in terms of fare values) while being
almost non-existent in lower fare classes.
Acknowledgements
I would first like to thank Delta Air Lines for their research funding and support. In
particular, Jill Hewes and the entire Revenue Control Department. as well as the "gang" in
Information Services. Without their help, this thesis would not have been possible.
To my thesis advisor, Peter Belobaba, I owe tremendous gratitude. Thank you for continu-
ally giving relevant advice, direction and making revisions all along the way. I am indebted to
you! The Flight Transportation Laboratory at M.I.T. provided continual support, both on an
intellectual and social level (particularly at office wine-tastings and "dinner parties"). Special
thanks to Ted Botimer and Biz Williamson for their continued friendship in the graduate pro-
gram. Also, thank you to Lyman Hazelton for his many contributions, including introducing
me to the world of IATEX.
My roomate in Boston, Angela McGrath, was always there with an ear to listen and a
shoulder to cry on. I couldn't have survived the past two years without her. Also thanks to
my friend Selina Jackson in L.A.. for providing a vacation haven (especially during the frigid
Bostonian winters).
Most importantly, I thank my family for always believing in me. My father Andrew Bo-
hutinsky for his strength and support (and for paying my phone bills to Kansas City), and a
special thanks to my mother. Kathy Bohutinsky for her confidence in me and continual source
of wisdom. I dedicate this dissertation to her.
Contents
1 Introduction 8
1.1 Structure of Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2 Airline Pricing Policies and Seat Inventory Management 12
2.1 A Brief History .............................. 12
2.2 The Advent of Deregulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3 Effects of Deregulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.4 Differential Pricing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.5 Current Fare Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.6 Seat Inventory Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3 Airline Demand and Booking Patterns 31
3.1 Air Transport Demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 31
3.2 Consumer Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.3 Passenger Choice Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.4 Elasticity of Demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4 Measurement of Potential Sell Up Benefits 55
4.1 A Description of Sell Up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.2 Predicting the Occurrence of Sell Up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.3 Revenue Impact Measurements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.4 Revenue Slope Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.5 Price Elasticity Measurements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
5 Assessment of Sell Up 76
5.1 Description of Test Methodology and Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
5.1.1 Preliminary Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
5.1.2 Preliminary Test Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
5.1.3 Expanded Study ... . .................... 85
5.1.4 Expanded Study Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
5.2 Price Elasticity Measurements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
6 Conclusions 101
6.1 'Research Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
6.2 Directions for Further Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
A Graphs of Daily Booking Information; Preliminary Study 108
B Booking Information; Expanded Study 113
C Graphs of Daily Booking Information; Expanded Study 116
List of Tables
2.1 A Major Airline's Fare Products for the BOS-WAS Market; March
1990 ......... .................................... 27
3.1 Passenger Choice Set for Round-Trip Travel from BOS to SFO . . . 41
3.2 Example of Alternative Itineraries Offered to a Passenger . . . . . . 48
5.1 Booking History for a Departed Flight, Day 30 to Day 0 . . . . . . . 79
5.2 Preliminary Sell Up Test Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
5.3 Preliminary Sell Up Test: Incremental Revenue Impact Results . . . 83
5.4 Example of Actions to be Taken, Two Week Study . . . . . . . . . . 86
5.5 Sell Up Policies Developed on an Individual Market Basis . . . . . . 87
5.6 Expanded Sell Up Test Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
5.7 Expanded Sell Up Test: Incremental Revenue Impact Results . . . . 92
5.8 Revenue Impact Results for "Y" and "B" Classes Only . . . . . . . . 94
5.9 Price Elasticity Measures for "H" and "KI" Classes . . . . . . . . . 100
B.1 Expanded Study, Coach Class Bookings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
List of Figures
2.1 Revenue Potential of a Flight Using Different Fare Class Options . 22
3.1 Passenger Choice Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
A.1
A.2
A.3
A.4
C.1
C.2
C.3
C.4
MCIATL "M", "H" Classes ...... ....................... 109
MCIATL "Q", "K" Classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
LGAATL "M", "H" Classes ..... ....................... 111
LGAATL "Q", "K" Classes ...... ....................... 112
ATLGSP "Y", "B" Classes, Flight B ...
GSPATL "Y" Class, Flights A, B .....
ATLDCA "M", "H" Classes, Flight B . .
BOSATL "Q", "K" Classes, Flight A ...
117
118
119
120
Chapter 1
Introduction
The setting is an air carrier's reservation office. The phone rings and is answered
by a reservations agent. The potential air traveler on the other end requests a seat
on a specific direct morning flight from Boston to Los Angeles:
9 Scenario One: This traveler requests a special promotional round-trip fare that
was advertised in the newspaper for $199. The reservations agent, after typing
the request into his conputer screen, finds that the special fare is not available
and offers the passenger a fare of $450 on the same flight. The passenger
decides to try a competing air carrier who is offering the same promotional
fare on a later connecting flight, since he is in no hurry to get to Los Angeles.
9 Scenario Two: This traveler also mentions that she noticed the advertisement
for the $199 fare from Boston to Los Angeles. The reservations agent is only
able to offer this passenger a $450 round trip ticket, as well. The passenger
decides to purchase the $450 ticket since her company is paying for it anyway
and she has to be in Los Angeles for an afternoon meeting.
Behavioral differences between these two passenger "types" are of great interest
to air carriers. In order to maximize airline revenues, it is necessary to try to satisfy
both types of consumers. Enough seats must be available at special promotional
rates t o prevent the Scenario One passenger from traveling on a different air carrier.
It is important, however, to restrict the number of these inexpensive seats in order to
realize as much revenue as possible from the Scenario Two passenger. Determining
just how many seats to reserve for the second type of passenger, who often makes
last minute reservations, is a complex and challenging problem.
Price differentiation in air travel plays an important role in current theories of
airline seat inventory management. This thesis discusses how to stratify the second
type of passenger who is willing to "sell up", or pay more for a seat on a given flight.
There are numerous benefits associated with sell up. It is highly desirable from
an air carrier's perspective to have sell up occur. The airline will gain higher revenue
from the passenger, and the costs of carrying this passenger will remain the same
regardless of which price is paid for a coach ticket. Thus, the potential exists to
increase overall revenues without increasing costs. The air carrier is also able to
fill an additional seat on a given flight. Not only does the carrier gain in terms of
passenger revenues, but the passenger is given an acceptable flight which satisfies
his/her travel needs.
It is important to correctly identify those flights which have sell up opportunities.
In not recognizing sell up potential, the carrier loses in in terms of flight revenues.
An excess of low fare seats will be reserved for Scenario One types of passengers, at
the expense of not saving these seats for those passengers willing to pay higher fares.
Potential demand for high fare seats will exceed the supply. Incorrect specification
of flights as having sell up potential results in revenue losses for the air carrier, as
well. Too many seats will be allowed for Scenario Two types of passengers, with not
enough passengers of this type to fill them. Supply of higher fare seats will exceed
the demand. A proper balance must be found, where supply equals demand for each
fare type.
1.1 Structure of Thesis
The remainder of this thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter Two begins with
a brief history of airline regulation and pricing policies during the time period prior
to 1978. Deregulation and its resulting effects on the industry are then highlighted.
The use of differential pricing methods in the development of current fare structures
follows, along with a discussion of fare class designations. The chapter concludes
with a description of current seat inventory management practices.
Chapter Three is an overview of demand and its relation to airline economic
theory. Consumers' utility measures for different travel itineraries are discussed. A
description of consumer behavior (luring the booking process follows along with a
suiniary of options available to a potential air traveler. This chapter concludes
with a discussion of price elasticities of demand for air travel.
The concept of sell up is discussed in great detail in Chapter Four. The chapter
begins with a description of the benefits of sell up to an air carrier. A brief history of
past attempts to predict sell up behavior is presented along with a discussion of how
to accurately predict the occurrence of sell up for a given flight. Once flights have
been identified as having sell up potential, a sell up strategy can be implemented and
tested using the revenue impact test developed. Measurement of price elasticities
using the information obtained from a sell up strategy is discussed in the latter
section of the chapter.
A sell up strategy developed and tested in an actual reservations environment in
the fall of 1989 and spring of 1990 is the subject of Chapter Five. A preliminary sell
alp study followed by an expanded study incorporating different sell up strategies
is <1escribed in detail. Revenue impact results, using measures developed in the
previois chapter, are presented. Price elasticity measurements are also described.
Chapter Six concludes the thesis by giving an overview of research findings and
contributions, as well as a brief discussion of further research directions.
Chapter 2
Airline Pricing Policies and
Seat Inventory Management
2.1 A Brief History
In a completely unregulated market, price is determined by the natural forces of
the market. Through a bargaining process between a seller (producer of the good)
and a buyer (demander of the good), price is determined. In the airline industry,
this process would consist of the airline as the seller with seats to be bought by the
potential passenger.
As with other modes of transportation, the government regulated the airline
industry for decades. The passage of the Civil Aeronautics Act in 1938 placed the
Civil Aeronautics Board (with occasional help from Congress and the President of
the United States) in charge of shaping the development of air transportation service
and the air transport industry. No one could enter into the business of public air
transportation unless authorized to do so by the CAB. Traffic between certain city-
pairs and even the carriage of certain categories of traffic had to be approved in
public hearings. Similarly, airlines could not lawfully terminate services to and from
certain city-pairs without CAB approval.
Route authority was not the only area subject to strict regulation. Passenger
fares had to be approved as well, and discrimination was prohibited. The Civil
Aeronautics Board applied public utility "rate of return on investment" principles
in its rate reviews and rate making, and all carriers were required to charge like
amounts for like services. The CAB attempted to take all cost variables into account
and then averaged the allowable costs into one overall formula. This formula was
then used to represent the average industry cost level, and was used as a proxy for
eflicient operating cost levels under existing technology. The formula was expected
to cover all allocated costs as well as a fair return on investment, and was applied
to the industry as a whole rather than to individual carriers.
The Civil Aeronautics Board formula did take into account that unit operating
costs vary inversely with flight segment length. A term was included to take this into
account, and thus, fare per mile decreased with increasing distance. However, cost
variation )etween routes was only reflected by differences in mileage. This resulted
in an inflexible fare structure for coach service where identical fares were applied
to all equal-distance markets, even though a higher or lower fare might have been
more appropriate based on specific cost or marketing considerations. Above-average
profits were realized on some routes and below-average profits on other routes. The
CAB concluded that the public would be best served by this type of fare structure
based on an averaging of profitability, as long as excess profits were not amassed
and ineflicient. operating costs were not incurred.
Since much of the operating cost of a flight is for fuel, labor, and airport usage,
the airlines could have gained additional revenue at comparatively little extra cost
by offering discounts to passengers who might have not flown at full fare. This
strategy was not. possible, however, prior to deregulation. Fares wre more or less
constrained to two price-quality combinations, first class and coach.
Airlines set to differentiate themselves in other ways, due to the lack of pricing
flexibility. Powerful drives were made toward product rather than price differen-
tiation. Carriers strove to differentiate their identically priced services by offering
varying frequencies, new equipment, alternate seating configurations, and often lav-
ish in-flight and ground services. Fancy meals served on linen and china and piano
lounges were not uncommon, as airline carriers competed for an increased market
share.
Scheduled air service was characterized by other standard quality of service con-
ditions. Carriers were publicly obligated to perform scheduled service regardless of
actual on-board loads. Tickets could be refunded at any time with no cancellation
penalty. If prices were lowered. the consumer could have the lower price, but was
protected from price increases. These conditions, coupled with a relatively simple
fare structure which remained stable over time, led to gross inefficiencies among air
carriers.
2.2 The Advent of Deregulation
Airline regulation gradually caine to be criticized, despite advances under the reg-
ulatory scheme, established with the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938. The basic
economic policies of the Act caine under attack in favor of completely unrestricted
competitive behavior. Tight government control of entry, exit, pricing and other
competitive matters was widely questioned.
With the advent of the 1970s, an intensified push for deregulation of the airline
indubstry began. Large increases in aircraft capacity due to wide-bodied jets, coupled
with an economic recession, served to decrease overall load factors. CAB pricing
policies were said to lead to airline inefficiencies, higher operating costs and, as a
result, higher prices than necessary. The 1973 Arab oil embargo increased fuel costs
substantially and airline operating costs soared. Traffic levels were again hurt by the
recession, leading to a series of fare increases. The increase in operating costs was
not exceeded by an increase in yields. All of this led to widespread speculation as
to whether the airlines themselves might be better off without the CAB regulatory
procedures.[10]
In July of 1975 a CAB report was issued based on a study of regulatory reform.
It s overall conclusions were:
"4... protective entry control, exit control, and public utility-type price
regulation under the Federal Aviation Act are not justified by the under-
lying cost and demand characteristics of commercial air transportation.
The industry is naturally competitive, not monopolistic."[12)
The study reconunended that route control (entry and exit) and public utility-type
price control in the domestic air transportation industry be eliminated within three
to five years.
A similar report was issued at about the same time by the Subconunittee on Ad-
ministrative Practice and Procedure of the U.S. Senate Judiciary Conunittee. The
report's most important message was that fares would and should be lower if a more
competitive system were to be allowed. While the Subcommittee acknowledged that
the Civil Aeronautics Board had been effective in maintaining reasonable industry
profits, technological improvement, and industry growth, the Board's practices had
not been effective in promoting low prices. It further stated that it was economically
and technologically possible to provide air service at significantly lower prices than
those currently available.[13]
The release of these two important studies led to the first deregulation bills
sponsored by the Ford Administration in 1975. These bills cuhninated in the passage
of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978. The overriding theme of this act was
to promote competition among airline carriers, which would lead to an increased
range of price/service options and increased airline efficiencies. Restrictions on air
carrier entry and exit were gradually eliminated over a three year period. Complete
abolishment of route restrictions occurred at the end of 1981, and airlines were free
to serve or to cease serving any and all domestic routes and cities. The provisions of
the Airline Deregulation Act also dealt with domestic fare values. Rate regulation
functions were amended to give more weight to the desirability of lower fares and
increased pricing and service options, with the gradual phasing out of all pricing
regulations. It was hoped that increased competition among air carriers would lead
to lower fares.
2.3 Effects of Deregulation
The passage of the Airline Deregulation Act in 1978 was the impetus for a series
of widespread changes in the airline industry. Routes served by each carrier, ser-
vice levels, marketing strategies. operating costs, and pricing policies were radically
affected by the advent of deregulation.
A major focal point for these changes has been the greatly increased emphasis
on hub-and-spoke network scheduling by airlines. All carriers began to shift their
primary emphasis from point-to-point nonstop service to hub-and-spoke patterns.
Prior routes that did not incorporate service to/from a hub were abandoned. This
new scheduling strategy provides an enormous multiplier effect as to the number
of city-pairs a carrier can serve. Cost and operational efficiencies can be realized
using this strategy, as maintenance, crew and training facilities can be conveniently
located at hub airports. Service improvements favoring larger communities were
realized, mostly due to the hub-and-spoke network development. In some cases,
small communities received decreased levels of service, particularly with the phasing
out of government subsidies for service to these areas. In general, more passengers
received improved service than those receiving reduced service.
Marketing strategies began to expand after deregulation, as carriers improved
computer reservation systems in hopes of increasing market share. The role of the
travel agent increased, and airlines sought to provide innovative services to attract
customer loyalties, such as frequent flyer programs. Operating costs decreased over-
all, as increased competition required carriers to make the most productive use of
their resources. Technological advances made during this period served to further
increase overall carrier efficiencies.
Deregulat ion also allowed airlines freedom in their pricing policies, allowing them
to lower prices as well as to charge a multiplicity of prices. A selective offering of
multiple price-quality combinations had the potential to induce more air travel and
increase airline revenues in comparison to what would be realized if all consumers
were~klharged the same price.
2.4 Differential Pricing
After deregulation, a carrier could offer any fare it wanted on any Right. It be-
came possible to offer a wide array of discount fares for the same coach seat on a
given flight. Changing fares was facilitated by posting new tariff conditions in a
centralized data base to which all carriers and travel agents had access, as opposed
to the elaborate previous procedure which required CAB approval. These legal and
technological changes transformed the fare structure of the U.S. domestic airline
indust'ry into a complex, ever-changing system.
This new freedom in pricing led to the introduction of advance purchase excur-
sion fares (APEX). American Airlines first introduced this type of fare into the U.S.
domestic travel market in 1975 with its "super-saver" fares. APEX fares required
an advance purchase of a round-trip ticket and a minimum length of stay at the
traveler's destination. These fares were offered for standard coach seats and only
differed from regular coach fares in their restrictions.
APEX fares were aimed at a different market segment than standard full-fare
tickets. A "leisure- traveler. defined as a vacation-type traveler, was more likely to
purchase APEX tickets. This type of passenger had a higher likelihood of know-
ing when he/she wished to travel in advance and was able to meet the advance
purchase/minimum stay requirements. Business travelers, on the other hand, were
more likely to travel at a last minute's notice. The nature of business travel forced
this market segment to buy standard, full-fare tickets. These passengers were more
willing to pay a higher fare in order to have the flexibility of making last-minute
decisions to or not to travel. without penalty. The restrictions imposed on APEX
fares were thus aimed at stimulating the market demand of vacation travelers (by
offering lower priced fares), and keeping potential full-fare business travelers from
purclasing these lower-priced tickets.
Airlines currently use a variety of methods to "fence out" (i.e. to prevent con-
sumers from purchasing a lower fare than they are willing to pay) full-fare business
travelers. The purpose of these "fences" is twofold: (1) To discourage air travelers
who would normally pay for the convenience and flexibility of on-demand sched-
tiled air service from taking advantage of low fares, preventing diversion of demand;
(2) To allow as many new passengers as possible to enter the market who would
not have done so at nornal levels, stimulating demand. Examples of these fencing
nethods include advance booking and payment services, minimum stay restrictions,
round-t rip conditions. cancellation charges, and unchangeable bookings.[14]
The potential to increase revenues by filling up otherwise empty seats was recog-
nized by airlines after deregulation gave them more freedom in pricing. In the short
run. airline operating costs are fairly fixed. Thus, the marginal cost of carrying
an additional passenger in a seat that would otherwise be empty is very small and
would essentially consist of the cost of reservations, ticketing, baggage handling, and
meal service. If revenue received by the additional passenger exceeds the marginal
cost of carrying the passenger. a contribution will be made to the fixed cost of the
flight.
A selective offering of a multiplicity of price-quantity combinations is often re-
ferred to as "differential pricing." This pricing method essentially charges each
cost omer what he or she is willing to pay. The discount fare passenger can be
distinguished from the full-fare passenger by charging different prices and apply-
ing fenct-s to restrict diversion. Potential benefits of differential pricing include the
stimulation of passenger demand, targeted at those who would not otherwise travel,
filling seats that would otherwise go empty.
Differential pricing methods are designed to capture different segments of market
demand. An extremely price sensitive passenger who is insensitive to time would be
willing to conform to restrictions imposed in order to pay the lowest price possible.
This passenger type wants the lowest fare available and is able to make travel adjust-
ments as necessary. Vacation travelers often fall into this category. A particularly
low fare could induce this passenger type to travel. Conversely, the unavailability
of a low fare could cause this passenger to decide against travel. The most common
type of passenger is both time and price sensitive. This passenger is somewhat flex-
ible in making travel arrangements and will conform to some restrictions in order
to pay a lower price. He/she cannot book far enough in advance in order to pay the
lowest fare, but possibly might make re-arrangements if savings are big enough. Pas-
sengers who are time sensitive but price insensitive are most conunonly the business
travelers. This passenger type has to travel at a specific time and is not able to make
advance arrangements. Flexibility and last minute seat availability are a necessity
for this traveler and he/she is willing to pay a high price for these conveniences.
An example of the benefits of using differential pricing is shown in Figure 2.1.
These graphs show the demand for a given flight using a classical linear demand
curve. Ticket price P, is plotted against the quantity of seats sold, Q. The first
graph shows the revenue potential of a flight offering only one fare value. The
airline would set the fare at the point which would generate the highest number of
passengers at the greatest fare. Revenue is defined as price times quantity of seats
sold. In Graph A, this would result in P = 75 seats sold at a $75 fare, generating
$5,625 in revenues. If the airline offered four fare classes, as in Graph B, $8,775 in
revenues could be generated from 100 passengers (10 x $140 + 35 x $105 + 30 x
$75 + 25 x $50 ).
2.5 Current Fare Structures
Airlines that wish to segment demand for their product must design a variety of fare
types which will be attractive to different types of travelers. The ideal product from
an air carrier's perspective would minimize the diversion of demand, or minimize
fence jumping by potential high fare passengers and would stimulate demand for
the lower class fare product.
On any particular flight, a variety of fare classes can be offered with different
restrictions applying to each fare class, in order to differentiate it from the others.
Passenger demand for different fare levels is governed primarily by the rules and
restrictions attributed to each fare. Fare classes are established on a market-by-
market basis, taking into consideration historical demand levels and competing air
carrier's offerings.
The airline industry makes use of a variety of techniques to "fence out" customers
from particular fare classes. Advance purchase requirements are the most common
restriction and are used in many travel markets. It has been shown that business
travelers consider total travel time and travel convenience in making their trip plans,
and typically make reservations an average of five days in advance compared with
twenty-one days in advance for vacation travelers. Advance purchase requirements
serve to prevent the diversion of business travelers to lower classes. Round-trip and
mininuun stay requirements often segment the market according to trip purpose.
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Figure 2.1: Revenue Potential of a Flight Using Different Fare Class Options
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Passengers traveling for non-business reasons are more able to adhere to round-
trip travel restrictions and are also more likely to stay at their destination longer.
Business travelers, on the other hand. are forty percent less likely to travel round-
trip, and due to the nature of their travel, stay at their destination for shorter time
periods.[15]
The industry has thus found that those consumers willing to conform to round-
trip and minimum stay requirements are generally price sensitive non-business trav-
elers. Seven-day minimum travel and Saturday night minimum stay are common
examples of travel restrictions used to segment fare classes. Non-stop travel is a
convenience valued by business travelers who are time sensitive. A premium is often
charged for the convenience of making a non-stop or one-stop trip. Day of week,
time of clay, and seasonal fluctuations allow air carriers to offer discounts during off-
peak hours, days of week, and seasons. These discounts cater to the non-business
travel sector. Market demand segmentation is possible when utilizing a combination
of these techniques for any given flight.
First class and business class services are priced at a premium above full coach
fares. These classes are aimed at price insensitive consumers and offer added ameni-
ties such as advanced check-in, upgraded meal service, free unlimited alcoholic bev-
erages, complimentary movies and expanded seating and leg-room. First class is
generally priced at up to fifty (50) percent above full coach fare, and is the most
extravagant, prestigious class in terms of service. While first class service has been
around for decades, the idea of a business class has appeared since deregulation.
Business class serves as an intermediate class between first and full fare coach, and
is aimed at price insensitive business travelers who desire upgraded service. Pre-
miums for travel in this class are generally only ten (10) percent above full coach
fare.
Most full coach (one-way) fares are based on a mileage-based or trip length
formula without any restrictions. These fares are aimed at the price insensitive
traveler who is often extremely time sensitive and desires flexibility in terms of
reservations as well as possible last-minute cancellation ability. Amenities associated
with this fare class often include advanced check-in for added convenience.
One-way discount fares are sometimes offered in very competitive markets that
have heavy demand for strictly one-way travel. These discounts range from ten (10)
to forty (40) percent off the full coach fare and often have up to one week advanced
purchase restrictions. In general, consumers desiring one-way travel do not qualify
for the weekend minimum stay requirements, which are often imposed upon the
more heavily discounted round-trip fares. These passengers often must return to
their origin during the same week. An example of this is a business traveler along
the Boston-Washington, D.C. corridor who is somewhat price sensitive but wishes
to travel within the five-day week period.
Excursion fares are even more deeply discounted and range from forty (40) to
sixty (60) percent (or more) off of full coach fares. Various fare levels in this cat-
egory are offered with increasing levels of restrictions as discount rates increase.
Restrictions include advance purchase requirements, minimum stay specifications.
cancellation penalties. and specific day of week travel. These fares were designed
for passengers who are less time sensitive (i.e. flexible as to time and date of travel)
and imore price sensitive. Business travelers who wish to extend a trip over a week-
end will take advantage of these fares, but they are most often utilized by vacation
travelers who are able to plan in advance and be flexible in terms of time of travel.
Special pronotional fares are often offered in highly competitive markets as a
carrier's attemlpt to increase market share, or as a way to entice potential travel-
ers (stimulate demand). These fares are often deeply discounted up to eighty (80)
percent off of full coach fares. The introduction of these fares often induces "fare
wars" among carriers, where price battles between airlines rage as a result of their
attempts to remain competitive. The relative ease of changing fares in the dereg-
ulated airline industry has served to exacerbate fare wars. A complicated, often
incomprehensible fare structure has resulted.
Different fare values and their corresponding restrictions are grouped into fare
classes in the reservations sytem, for the purpose of controlling booking levels and
accepting reservations. A specific fare product is a fare level and the restrictions
imposed on the purchase of the ticket (if any). For example, a "HWE7P50" fare
product is a "H" class ticket to be used for weekend travel ("W"), excursion product
("E"), seven day in advance purchase ("7"), with a fifty percent of the ticket price
cancellation penalty ("P50"). Several fare products could belong to one particular
fare class. An example of a major airline's fare products for the Boston Washington
market, offered in March of 1990 is shown in Table 2.1.
In general, fare classes are specified by a particular letter code and correspond
to a specific seating area of the plane. The letter "F" is commonly used to des-
ignate first class, and the letter "C" is often used for business class designations.
Coach fare classes are generally more complicated, with the industry standard be-
ing "Y" designated for full fare coach, while all discounted seats may be specified
as "B", "M" ," H "Q","K" and "L" classes, in descending value. This fare class
structure will be used throughout this thesis, but is just one example of a coach
fare class specification. Fare class structures can differ between air carriers. All
passeriers purchasing seats in coach class ("Y" through "L" classes) will sit in the
same coach section of the plane. Service characteristics differ only in the number of
restrictions imposed on the fare classes, with "Y' class representing.the completely
unrestricted full fare coach fare, "B" class as a somewhat restricted, slightly dis-
counted excursion fare, through "L" class, representing a highly restricted, deeply
discounted promotional fare.
2.6 Seat Inventory Control
The potential benefits of filling otherwise empty seats with low-fare passengers that
an airline would otherwise not have carried must be weighed against the possibility of
displacing potential higher-fare paying passengers that would have been otherwise
carried. The problem is further complicated by numerous flights operated by an
airline during the course of a given time period, of which any one or combination of
two or more could be used to carry a passenger to his/her destination. The existence
of a multitude of fare classes for each flight and fluctuating levels of demand over
time also makes the problem a difficult one to manage.
Seat inventory control addresses the issue of balancing the number of bookings
in each fare class with the goal of maximizing total passenger revenues. By offer-
ing more seats at lower fares, an airline can capture extra passengers that would
otherwise not have traveled. Too many seats at low fares will result in diversion of
potential higher fare passengers to lower fares, lowering overall revenues. An airline
is able to influence total yields, or the average revenue traveled per passenger mile,
by applying effective seat inventory control techniques on a flight-by-flight basis,
thus potentially increasing overall revenues.
Effective yield management, or revenue management, includes not only seat
inventory control, but pricing techniques as well. However, fare classes are often
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set according to competitor's offerings in similar markets. It is the view of many
managers in the airline industry, including the president of American Airlines, that
the "most important aspect of fare competition is not absolute fare levels but the
art of managing the mix of fares on a given airplane."[5] Seat inventory control is
thus the aspect of revenue management that the airline has complete c9ntrol over,
with the potential to increase revenues on a flight-by-flight basis.
In seeking the best mix of passengers, the air carrier must be able to structure and
manage its reservations system more effectively, setting appropriate limits governing
the number of passengers in each fare class for a given flight. Different price/route
combinations can Ahen be evaluated with the goal of determining the best mix
in terms of overall revenue. A computer-based system with an efficient revenue
optimization model is necessary to meet the reservation monitoring objective.
On any given flight, operating costs are relatively fixed, and the marginal cost
of carrying another passenger is small. Seat inventory control assumes the task
of maximizing total revenues, which in turn serves to maximize overall profits for a
flight. Thus, a model must be developed where the objective function is to maximize
total revenues on a given flight subject to the limitations imposed by the flight
capacity, schedule constraints, and the reservation system's ability. The type of
aircraft for a specific flight is determined in advance, and thus the number of seats
in the coach cabin can be determined. Schedules are posted in advance, and in most
cases even fare. classes can be assumed relatively fixed in the short term. The output
from this model would be the optimal number of seats to make available in each
fare class in the coach cabin in order to maximize revenues.
Proper yield management can be beneficial both from the standpoint of the
passenger and the air carrier. The passenger is able to select from a variety of
price/service options and yield management tecimiques are such that the price of
a seat on a given day is dictated by demand. This demand-based pricing concept
makes it possible for an airline to provide passengers with a level of service that
would not otherwise be financially possible. The airline is able to generate higher
revenues by allocating seats to different fare classes than by only using one fare
class. Often, flights that would otherwise be unable to fully cover operating costs,
are able to operate profitably, by using yield management techniques.
Demand for seats on a flight is extremely dynamic. Some forecast of demand
levels is necessary in order to properly utilize a seat inventory control model. Using
historical booking patterns, demand by fare class can be determined. Day of week,
weekly, and seasonal fluctuations in demand must be accounted for in the forecasting
process, as well as unusual situations such as holidays and regional special events.
This information must be stored in the reservations system for use as inputs to the
seat inventory control model.
Demand must also be monitored throughout the booking process as the number
of requests changes due to cancellations and new reservations. Initial booking limits
will be set for each fare class on a flight departure basis. Actual bookings relative
to these limits must be monitored, and limits must be adjusted as bookings are
accepted.
The complexity of this process is enormous. Booking limits must not only be set
for each flight for local (non-connecting) traffic, but passengers with different origin-
destination itineraries who utilize a flight as a connection must also be taken into
account. In effect, decisions must be made on whether to allocate a seat to a local
passenger or a connecting passenger in terms of maximizing flight revenues. With
the development of the hub-and-spoke network system, the number of connecting
passengers has increased substantially. A given flight leg can be used to serve as
many as forty possible flight destinations. With as many as seven fare classes offered
for each origin-destination market, this creates two-hundred and eighty different
potential fare classes per destination on a single flight leg!
Proper designation of booking limits per fare class on a given flight is an ex-
tremely important issue and a challenging problem faced by air carriers in today's
deregulated environment. The potential to substantially increase revenues using seat
inventory control methods has greatly increased the importance of revenue manage-
ment. The process by which to allocate these limits is constantly being improved
and modified in an effort to truly optimize revenues.
Chapter 3
Airline Demand and Booking
Patterns
3.1 Air Transport Demand
Air transportation demand analysis relates the demand for air transportation to
the socioeconomic activities that generate it. Its main purpose is to achieve an
understanding of the determinants of demand and the manner in which they interact
and affect the evolution of traffic volumes.[7]
Demand for transportation in general is unique in that it is a derived demand.
Actual transit required by travel is not desirable, but is a means of being at certain
locations at certain times. This need is derived from the desire to undertake certain
patterns of activities. To understand the demand for air travel, it is necessary
to understand the basic human desires for various activity patterns. From this
understanding, one can derive the demand for travel to certain locations.
Air travel demand is a function of socioeconomic variables and system supply,
or level of service variables. Two types of models exist for predicting transporta-
tion demand. A macro-model is useful in forecasting overall activity levels in air
transportation. and deals with systemwide measures of air travel.-A micro-model
of air travel demand is more concerned with specific traffic flows, and can be used
as a planning tool. The micro-model's results are often used as an input for a seat
inventory management system, providing estimates of demand by fare class. The
most common type of model in microanalysis is by origin and destination, often
called a city-pair model. In general, a typical micro-model would follow the general
formulation:
T = T(L, S) (3.1)
where T = a measure of traffic
L = a vector of socioeconomic activity levels that determine the demand
for air travel
S = a vector of transportation supply variables
The choice of L, the socioeconomic variables for city-pair models, must include
several demographic measures. Population of the area served by an airport must be
considered. A market area containing a large number of people is generally better
for air travel than one with only a small population. However, population size
alone is not often enough to predict air travel demand. Industrial structure gives
a good indication of the types of air travel demanded. A structure based mainly
on agricultural production would have a lesser potential for business travel than
a structure with an emphasis on manufacturing. Employment statistics are also
important and must include occupation type as well as disposable income measures
on a per-capita basis. These variables will be very important in influencing leisure
air travel potential. Other factors influencing leisure travel can be the age structure
of the population and family structures. If zgn origin-destination pair is dominated by
passengers traveling to or from other points (connecting passengers), socioeconomic
data for these passengers must also be included in the model. This increases the
complexity of the modeling procedure.
Supply variables S, can be specified in greater detail since the characteristics
of the air transportation system connecting any two city-pairs is generally known.
Level of air fares on a route are crucial variables, particularly for leisure travelers,
where price elasticities tend to be high. Air fares of competing carriers will also play
an important role in instances of high price elasticities. Travel time is an important
consideration and represents the time costs of air travel. This variable will obviously
play an important role in business travel demand, where time elasticities tend to
be high. Frequency of service variables are used to measure trip convenience. The
more flights available, the more convenient are departure and arrival times likely
to be. Trip reliability measures are often included in terms of space availability,
schedule reliability, and trip safety. Fares and characteristics of competing modes
of transport must be taken into account on short-haul routes. Other possible level
of service attributes include flight schedules, routings, and equipment types.
The importance of proper demand analysis to air carriers cannot be understated.
Its use in forecasting future traffic volumes affects fleet acquisitions', scheduling,
and route determination. The role demand forecasting plays in the seat inventory
management process is of utmost importance. Precise forecasts of bookings yield
better inputs into the seat inventory optimization procedure, which results in an
improved allocation of seats among fare classes.
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3.2 Consumer Behavior
A model which effectively describes passenger demand for air travel is based on the
theory of consumer decision-making. The behavior of a large number of individu-
als expressed in terms of aggregate quantities such as the market demand for an
airline product is frequently of interest. This aggregate behavior is the result of
individual decisions. The modeling of individual behavior is the basis of all models
which predict aggregate behavior. Individuals face different choice situations and
have varying tastes. While the goal is to ultimately predict aggregate demand, it is
import ant to first treat the differences in decision-making processes among individ-
uals. The term "individual" can be defined as any group that behaves as a single
unit in making transportation decisions. For simplicity, the term consumer is often
used here to denote a single decision-making unit.
The decision maker's environment determines what is often called the universal
set of alternatives. A subset of this universal set, the choice set, is what the consumer
considers on an individual level.[4] Any choice set is made from a nonempty set
of alternatives. The choice set contains the alternatives that are feasible to the
decision maker and those that are known during the decision process. In the airline
reservations process, a choice set would consist of all flight itineraries acceptable to
a particular consumer. Each alternative is discontinuous from the other alternatives
in the choice set.
In general, a consumer with a desired travel itinerary will have a variety of air
travel options from which to choose. The passenger will demand travel from his
or her origin to a specific destination Dik, which will be satisfied with a departure
flight i. on a specific air carrier, k. In many cases, this passenger will also demand
travel from the destination back to the origin in the form of a return flight Rik, on
flight j, traveling on carrier k. Each travel "package", or itinerary will be offered
to the consumer at a certain fare class level L,k, in fare class m, on carrier(s) k,
which consists of the price and restrictions that come with a ticket purchase. Thus,
a typical item within a consumer's choice set for a round-trip travel itinerary would
appear as follows:
I, = F(Dik, Rik, Link) (3.2)
where I,, represents itinerary n.[2] The choice set itself for a consumer would consist
of one or more alternatives. An N numbered choice set would follow the general
formulation:
(Il1, I2, .. - - IN) (3-3)
For examlple, if a consumer was interested in traveling round-trip from Boston to
San Francisco on the evening of February 9, returning on the evening of February 12,
the choice set would consist of those flights with seats available during the two re-
quested time periods which satisfy the individuals' constraints. Assuming that three
travel itineraries fulfill the consumer's travel criterion the choice set would consist
of the three different travel options. The characteristics of these three alternatives
are listed in Table 3.1, and the choice set would appear as follows:
(II, 12, 13)
Each option would consist of the following:
I = F((D378.A:34.A), R983.A, LH,A)
12 = F(D123.B, R269,B, LK.B)
13 = F(D976,c, R237,D, LQ,C;Q,D)
Thus, itinerary one. I1, begins with a departure on Flight 378 on Airline A connect-
ing with Flight 34 on the same carrier. The return flight is on Flight 983 on Airline
A, and the passenger would be booked in a Class H fare package. Itinerary two, 12
consists of a departure on Flight 123 on Airline B, a return on Flight 269 on Airline
B and the fare package is a Class K. The third itinerary 13 consists of a departure
on Flight 976 on Airline C returning on Flight 237 on Airline D, booked in Class Q.
A decision rule is necessary if two or more alternatives are available. This de-
cision rule describes the cognitive process used by the decision maker to evaluate
the information available in order to reach a specific choice. Utility measures can
be a way of modeling individuals' choice. One can define a single objective function
expressing the attractiveness of an alternative in terms of its attributes. This index
of attractiveness is often referred to as utility, a measure that the decision maker
attemlpts to maximize through his or her choice.
Economists have always assumed that individuals make those choices that are
the most favorable to them. It is well known from the classical economists that:
"An object can have no value unless it has utility. No one will give
anything for an article unless it yields him (or her) satisfaction."161
It is recognized that individuals seldom take actions that are counter to their own
best interests.
Since utility is used as a term for overall satisfaction, it is clear that this mea-
sure is affected by a variety of factors. The characteristics of a commodity or a
conbination of commodities are the same for all consumers. The personal element
in consuner choice arises in the differences between collections of characteristics,
depending upon individual preferences. Thus, the conunodity does not give utility
to the consumer, but it possesses characteristics, and these characteristics give rise
to utility. In general, a commodity will possess more than one characteristic and
many characteristics will be shared by more than one coinmodity.[8] The attractive-
ness of an alternative to a consumer is evaluated in terms of a vector of attribute
values.
In comparing different attributes, the decision maker uses the notion of trade-
offs in order to make an optimal decision. For example, it may be necessary for a
consumer to pay a higher price for a travel itinerary, if this consumer desires a non-
stop flight. The value that the consumer places on time will be the determinant of
whether the higher price is paid. In contrast, a passenger wishing to obtain a highly
discounted fare may be willing to make one or more connections in the itinerary,
depending upon the p)assenger's value of time. Trade-offs between price and time
will be made in either case. Relative importance of each characteristic to a consumer
will vary according to individual tastes.
It must be noted that travel is not taken for the sake of travel itself. The purpose
of travel, in most cases, is to be at a particular place at a specific time. This makes
transportation demand, or specifically air transport demand unique, because the
potential benefits associated with it are the benefits of arriving at a particular place
at a particular time, and then returning to one's destination. The transport process
does not impose much utility, but the end result (arrival at a specific destination)
gives utility to the passenger. The trip imposes costs in terms of the passenger's
time. as well as monetary costs. which can be referred to as the negative utility,
or d07tility of travel. In this case, instead of maximizing utility, the consumer is
assumied to minimize disutility. The end result is the sane.[9)
For the previous example of a potential air travel consumer making a decision
between three different options, the characteristics of each itinerary (shown in Table
3.1) are reduced into three disutility values, U(Ii), U(I 2 ), and U(13 ). The trav-
eler will select the flight with the lowest disutility, or the flight with the minimum
generalized costs.
The disutilities of air travel are numerous, but can be grouped into three distinct
groups:
1. Monetary Coqt, M, refers to the actual price paid for travel. These values will
vary widely, frepending upon the fare class purchased. As shown in Chapter
2. a first class ticket can cost as much as one and one-half times the price of
a standard coach class ticket. On the other hand, a deeply discounted special
promiotional fare can be reduced as much as eighty percent from the price of
a standard coach fare. This attribute of a trip will be of more importance to
those travelers who are highly price sensitive. Leisure travelers, in particular,
will rank this characteristic highly on their list of important characteristics.
2. Travel Tinie.-Ti, refers to the total time of travel. This characteristic can
include a variety of factors. Actual departure and arrival times will play an
important role in the consumer's decision-making process. Another important
factor that can be included in this category is whether the trip will be a non-
stop flight, one-stop or multiple-stop flight, or whether a connecting flight will
be necessary. The disutility of travel increases with an increasing number of
stops and connections from origin to destination because of necessary waiting
and transfer times which increase the total time of travel. The possibility of
unscheduled delays is increased with the number of stops and connections, as
well. Other factors which can be included into the travel time category include
airport access and egress time (travel time to and from an airport), waiting
time, and processing time. The travel time characteristic will be of greater
importance to those travelers who are highly time sensitive. Business travelers
most frequently fall into this category, and will place travel time on the top of
their list of important attributes to consider.
3. Convenience Attributes, C;, refer to the convenience, or in some cases the in-
convenience of traveling on a particular travel itinerary. In certain higher fare
classes, these variables are positively valued by the consumer (thus giving a
negative disutility). An example of this would be first class travel, which allows
the passenger to be pampered and travel in a more comfortable atmosphere.
In general, reservations can be made without advance notice, and cancellations
can be made without penalty. Discounted coach fare classes carry negatively
valued convenience attributes which give disutility to a travel itinerary. These
fare classes carry certain restrictions, or rules and penalties imposed on certain
fare classes in order to "fence" out passengers who would be willing to pay
a higher price to travel. Examples of these, as discussed in Chapter 2, are
advanced purchase restrictions, cancellation fees, minimum stay requirements,
and specific travel time restrictions. Some fare classes, such as first class,
business class, and full fare coach classes, have no restrictions. Highly dis-
counted coach class tickets have many restrictions imposed upon them, which
give a high disutility to these fare classes terms of convenience. The number of
stops on a given flight and the number of connections to be made can also be
grouped into this category. As the number of stops and connections increases,
the convenience to the passenger decreases. Other characteristics which can
be grouped into this category include trip reliability (on-time departure and
arrival records), trip safety measures, and the convenience of travel-making
arrangements.
Thus, a negative utility function, or a disutility function can be formulated for
each travel itinerary, I,,, including each attribute which influences a passenger's
choice. If we choose to express this choice in terms of minimizing disutility, rather
that maximizing utility, the function can be expressed in terms of a generalized cost
function:
U(Ii) = U(M, Ti, C) (3.4)
The cost function thus gives a positive value to all negatively valued attributes (or
disutilities), and is expressed in terms of the three main groupings of attributes
described previously, monetary costs, Mi, time costs Ti, and convenience costs (or
inconveniences), C,. An example of different itinerary attributes for round-trip
travel from Boston to San Francisco is shown in Table 3.1. Each itinerary can be
differentiated in terms of its attributes, and the consumer will use an individual
generalized cost function to determine which combination of these attributes best
suits his or her preferences.
The objective is thus to choose the travel itinerary which minimizes the gener-
alized cost to the consumer,
milnimizeU(I;) = U(Mi, Ti, C)
or. to choose the alternative with the minimum cost by minimizing the objective
function:
min[U(11 ), U(1 2),. -, U(In)] (3.5)
ITINERARY
I1 : (D378,A34,A, R9A,LH.A) $350.00
12 : (D123,B, R269,B, LK,B) $500.00
13 : (D 976,c, R237.D, LQC;QD) $450.00
8 hours One-stop
14-Day Advance Purchase
Non-Refundable
6 hours Non-Stop
6 hours Non-Stop
7-Day Advance Purchase
Table 3.1: Passenger Choice Set for Round-Trip Travel from BOS to SFO
In terms of travel itineraries, the consumer will have the following general cost
function:
xi = X(I1,2, ... II,) (3.6)
As stated before, I,, represents a consumer's choice set for a round-trip travel
itinerary and is a function of the price and restrictions with a specific fare class
level:
I = F(Dik, Rk, Lmk)
Restrictions are imposed such that within the choice set:
I I if Itinerary i is chosen,0 otherwise;
Only one itinerary is generally chosen by the consumer:
1112 = 1113 = 1213 =, ., = 0 (3.7)
Under these restrictions the general cost function can have only a finite possible
number of values,
(X (1, 0,. 0), X (0, 1,. .. , 0), X (0, 0,.
M11' Ti
For the example used previously, where the consumer has three unique travel
itineraries from which to choose, a generalized cost function expressed in terms of
the Attributes of the alternatives is as follows:
U(IS) = U(M1,T1,C1)
U(I 2 ) = U(M2 ,T 2, C2)
U(13 ) = U(M 3 ,T 3, C3 )
The function U(Ij), which maps the attributes values to a generalized cost scale, is
an ordinal generalized cost function.[4] Itinerary 1, for example will be chosen if and
only if
U(I 1 ) - U(I 2) < 0
and
U(I 1 ) - U(13 ) < 0
The alternative I1 will be chosen because the generalized cost:
U(1) < U(1 2 )
and
T(I1) < U(13 )
U(I1) represents the minimum generalized cost, or minimum disutility to the con-
suiner.
In the decision process, the consumer will first explicitly formulate preferences
for all possible combinations of attributes. He or she will then identify all of the
alternatives open, which are listed in Table 3.1, and will characterize each alterna-
tive in terms of its attributes. In this case, three alternative round-trip itineraries
are acceptable to the consumer and have been identified in terms of their level of
service attributes: monetary cost, travel time., and convenience attributes. The de-
cision process follows from the definition of disutility. The consumer will choose the
alternative that. has the lowest disutility as determined by his/her expressed pref-
erences. Trade-offs will be made between different attributes. When the consumer
chooses itinerary one, I1, the general cost function will appear as X (1, 0, 0). I1 in
this example consists of a departure flight with a connection D37s,A;34,A, a return
flight R983,A, at a fare level LH.A. In this case,
13 J 12 ] A1
or. itinerary one is preferred to itinerary two, which is preferred to itinerary three.
This consumer obviously places a high value on monetary cost and is willing to make
trade-offs in terms of travel time and convenience attributes in order to save money.
Thus, although
T1 > T2 > T3
and
M 1 < M2 < 1113
the lower monetary cost of itinerary one overrides its higher travel time for this
price elastic passenger. A more time sensitive consumer would select itineraries two
or three. To this passenger. travel time would be of greater importance than the
monetary costs, and tradeoffs would be made in order to obtain a shorter travel
time.
3.3 Passenger Choice Options
Predicting human behavior is a challenging task. People are complex and their
preferences and decision-making behaviors are different and constantly changing. It
is necessary to understand this behavior in order to adequately prediet future travel.
Any no(el for explaining consumer behavior must consider: (1) what alternative
choices consumers perceive; (2) what consequences these alternatives they consider
important, and; (3) how they make their choices among the preferred alternatives.[9]
The decisions that a potential air traveler faces are first whether to make a
trip, where to make a trip, at what time to make a trip, what route to take, and on
what, air carrier on which to travel. These decisions are highly interrelated. Some are
fixed. depending upon trip purpose. For example, a business traveler would have the
"whether", "where", and often the "time" fixed. A vacation traveler would be more
flexible: all of the options are often open and sometimes determined simultaneously.
In choosing among different alternatives, a passenger is influenced by his or her
socioeconomic background and, most importantly, the level of service attributes of
a trip.
Once a passenger decides to potentially make a trip and has some idea as to where
he or she wants to go, outside help is necessary. In order to make a reservation, the
consumer must make contact directly with a specific airline or travel agent. Although
passengers can purchase tickets directly from an airline, most tickets today are
purchased through travel agents. Agencies have been used even more by the public
since deregulation, due to the increased number of flights being offered and to the
ext reiely comnplex and often confusing fare structure that has ensued. According
to one estimate, about 74 percent of the total revenues of U.S. airlines come from
tickets bought through agents.(11]
In a reservations framework. whether with a travel agent or a specific air carrier,
the passenger will make a request for travel. Some passengers will request specific
flight numb'ers on a carrier, while others will simply give their desired destination
and times of travel. Extremely price elastic travelers may simply give a price range
as their only criterion of choice. In any case, if the consumer's request is satisfied, a
seat on a specific flight at a fare class level will be assigned to the passenger in the
form of a reservation. For example, a specific flight itinerary will be reserved for a
passenger in the form similar to (DiA, R2A, LKA), a departure flight, DiA, a return
flight R2A, at a fare class level LKA. These seats will be decremented from the
booking limits set through seat inventory control methods. For example, if Class K
on Flight 1 on Airline A has a booking limit of 25 seats, a reservation made in this
class will decrement the available inventory to 24 seats.
What happens if a consuner's initial request is not satisfied? That is, upon
selecting a particular flight/fare class option, suppose the request is refused due to
a limited number of seats. The request could be denied due to limitations on the
departure flight, the return flight. or on a specific fare class level on either flight.
If a potential passenger's initial request is denied, an attempt will be made to offer
another itinerary which matches the original itinerary as closely as possible. It is to
the original airline's benefit if this "second-best" itinerary includes travel on their
airline. in which case no revenue will be lost. On the other hand, the new itinerary
could incorporate travel on another carrier, which would represent a revenue loss to
the airline. From this, one can see why actions taken by passengers who are denied
a specific flight itinerary are of concern to air carriers today.
Depending on the purpose of travel, several options are available to consumers
who are denied a requested flight itinerary. If a potential passenger's choice set (IN)
contains more than one option, the passenger will choose the next best itinerary.
One possible option to the passenger would be the choice of the same departure
flight and return flight at a higher fare class (DIA, R2A, LQA), where the price of a
"Q" class ticket exceeds that of an "L" class ticket. In this instance, the passenger
woidd be paying a higher value for the same departure and arrival flights. A price
inelastic, time sensitive business traveler would be most likely to make this kind of
a shift from a lower fare class (in this case "K" class) to a higher fare class ("Q"
class). Conversely, a price elastic "leisure" traveler would be less likely to make this
shift. A shift such as this is often called a vertical shift, and is defined as a shift up
in fare classes on the same flight(s).
Another option could be chosen with perhaps a different return flight on the
same airline, with the same departure flight initially requested, (D3A, R2A, LA).
Depending upon the number of options within a consiuner's choice set incorporating
travel on the initially requested air carrier, the list could continue indefinitely. If this
shift occurs on the same airline (i.e. the passenger chooses a different return flight
on the same air carrier), the airline continues to receive the passenger's revenue.
In this case, a horizontal shift occurs. or a shift to a different flight(s) on the same
airline. This occurrence does not hurt the airline; passenger revenue is not lost.
Not every passenger will choose an itinerary which incorporates travel on the
same carrier. There is a possibility that the next best itinerary in a passenger's
choice set will consist of the following: (D4B, RSB, LLB). In this case, the traveler
has decided to make reservations on Carrier B, resulting in a reservation loss to
Carrier A. This represents a booking loss to the airline and is what air carriers try to
minimiize. A booking loss is defined as a shift to a flight on another airline, incurring
a loss in passenger revenue. Booking losses can also be incurred if a passenger decides
not to travel at all, which also represents a revenue loss. The decision not to travel
coild occur'if a passenger only had one itinerary in his or her choice set, or if all of
the itineraries in a passenger's choice set were unavailable.
What causes these shifts to be made in terms of a consumer's generalized cost
function, or disutility function? As stated previously, every individual has a unique
generalized cost function, which explicitly gives a potential passenger's preferences
in terms of trip attributes. The individual hopes to minimize this function, and
therefore minimize the total disutility of travel. When choosing between different
travel itineraries, a consumer is able to rank each itinerary in terms of order of
preference in accordance with the attributes each itinerary possesses. In an airline
reservations framework, upon being denied an initial request a passenger is often
given several options from which to choose. These choices could incorporate poten-
tial vertical or horizontal shifts, or booking losses to the initial carrier if options are
included incorporating travel on different air carriers. The option of not traveling
at all is also a possibility, and can be included in the choice set.
Table 3.2 lists the three additional options made available to a passenger who is
initially denied a request for travel on 1. The passenger will make the next choice
using the following rule:
min[T(I) - U(I 1 )]
such that
U(I;) < Z
or minimize the difference in generalized costs (minimize disutility) between itinerary
one and the next best alternative. The variable Z represents the disutility of not
traveling. Thus, the passenger attempts to choose the next best travel itinerary,
makifig sure that the disutility of this itinerary is less than the disutility of not
making the trip.
ITINERARY
(D1A, R2A, LKA)
(D1A, R2A, LQA)
(D3A, R2A, LKA)
(D4B, RB, LLB)
Not to Travel
UTILITY PASSENGER CHOICE SHIFT
U(1 2 ) Vertical Shift, ii
U(1 3 ) Horizontal Shift, h
U(I) Booking Loss, I
Z Booking Loss, I
Table 3.2: Example of Alternative Itineraries Offered to a Passenger
A passenger making a vertical shift would quantify, in terms of generalized costs:
(I 2 ) - UT(I1) = ?mjn[U(12) - U(I1), U(I) - U(i), U(1 4 ) - U(11 ), Z - U(I1)I
Similarly, a horizontal shift will be made if
U(I 3 ) - U(1i)
is the minimum difference in generalized cost to the passenger. A booking loss will
be incurred if either
U(I4) - U(I1)
or
Z - U(I 1 )
are the smallest differences in generalized costs.
Airlines are naturally interested in the proportion of passengers that, upon being
refused their initial request for a travel itinerary, will choose another itinerary which
incorporates travel on the same airline. This proportion has been referred to as the
recaptirc ratc by American Airlines, and is defined as the "likelihood that a customer
whose initial reservation request is refused, makes a subsequent request on the same
airline. and there is space available to satisfy this request."(1] Air carriers realize
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the impact that recapture has on all aspects of seat inventory control. Refused
reservation requests could result in reduced airline revenues if passengers decide to
travel on other carriers or not to travel at all.
In general, three possible alternatives exist to a passenger who is initially denied
a request:
1. The passenger can choose the same travel itinerary at a higher fare class, or
perform a vertical shift, v.
This option is often referred to as sell up, which refers to a passenger purchasing a
higher fare class ticket on the same travel itinerary originally requested.
2. The passenger can choose from a different travel itinerary on the same airline,
which is defined as a horizontal shift, h.
Both options one and two are included in the concept of recapture rate, RR, because
they incorporate shifts within the same air carrier. In addition to shifts which
improve the airline's recapture rate, another option exists to passengers:
3. The passenger can choose from a different travel itinerary on a different air
carrier or decide not to travel at all, which results in a booking loss, I to the
airline.
Air carriers hope to minimize the occurrence of this alternative because of its detri-
mental impact on passenger revenues.[2]
The percentage of total passengers that are originally denied a request who
choose a particular alternative can be expressed in terms of probabilities. Thus,
each alternative can be expressed as follows:
P(r) The probability of a vertical shift, or the sell up probability if the
passenger is initially denied a request.
P(h) The probability of a horizontal shift if the passenger's original
request is denied.
P(l) The probability of a booking loss if the passenger is initially denied
a request.
In ternis of recapture rate, or recapture probability, P(r):
P(r) = P(v) + P(h) (3.8)
Also, once a passenger is denied I-s or her original request,
P(v) + P(h) + P(l) = 1 (3.9)
which states that the passenger has three and only three alternatives when this
occurs. Figure 3.1 incorporates these probabilities with the previous example used
in Table 3.2 in the form of a flow chart, detailing various passenger choice options.
The above listed probabilities are of great importance to airlines. In order to
maximize total revenues, an air carrier's objective function is to minimize the nui-
ber of booking losses, which represent a loss in revenue to a carrier or, conversely, to
maxinize the number of recaptured passengers. By minimizing booking losses, the
airline seeks to decrease the number of passengers being diverted to travel on other
carriers. In maximizing the recapture probability, or vertical and horizontal passen-
ger shifts, the air carrier seeks to retain passenger revenues when initial passenger
re(uests are denied. Methods of measuring these probabilities and improving total
air carrier revenues will be discussed further in Chapter 4.
Figure 3.1: Passenger Choice Options
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3.4 Elasticity of Demand
Sensitivity to different itinerary attributes can be related to consumer demand using
elasticity values. Elasticities are used by economists to summarize how the changes
in one variable of a demand function will affect demand for a product. For example,
it might be of interest to measure how the change in the price of an item affects the
quantity demanded. This is probably the most important application of the concept
of elasticity and is referred to as the price elasticity of demand. Changes in the price
of a good will lead to changes in the quantity demanded, and the price elasticity of
demand is intended to measure this response. Formally, demand for air travel, D,
depends upon many variables including the monetary cost of a ticket, M:
D = f(M, ... ) (3.10)
where the (lots in the equation indicate the other variables that demand for air travel
depend on. The elasticity of demand with respect to price is defined as2:
eDf=AD M
eD,M D311)
This elasticity value tells us how D changes with respect to a percentage change
in JA. In most cases, AD/Ail is negative. This is explained by the fact that Il
and D are most likely to move in opposite directions. As the price of a product
increases, demand for the product usually decreases. Thus, eD,M will usually be
negative. For example, a value of eD,M of -1 would mean that a 1% rise in price
would lead to a 1% decline in the quantity demanded.
If CD,M is less than negative one, a price increase is met by a more than propor-
tionate demand decrease. Passengers who are highly price sensitive would exhibit
2 I Il.s I ,1.nally t hr telinition of a specific type of elasticity. nu arc elasticity
this type of behavior and are referred to as price elastic. Demand is elastic if a given
percentage change in price results in a larger percentage change in the number of
passengers carried. Conversely, if CD,M is greater than negative one (and less than
zero), quantity demanded will increase proportionally less than price increases. Air
travelers who are more price insensitive will have this demand characteristic and are
referred to as price inelastic. A given percentage change in price is accompanied by
a relatively smaller change in the number of passengers carried.
Another way of determining elasticity is to see what happens to total revenue
as a result of a price change. If demand is elastic, an increase in price will result in
a decrease in total revenues, because the sharp decline in the number of passengers
carried will not be offset by the increase in fare per passenger. The opposite will
occur for inelastic demand. with an increase in total revenues resulting from a price
increase.
Determinants of the elasticity of demand with respect to price are many. Busi-
ness travelers tend to be less responsive to price changes than leisure travelers, and
thus have more inelastic demand curves. These passengers are often on expense ac-
counts and, due to the nature of their travel, are unable to make their reservations
far in advance. Time of travel is much more important to them than the price of
a ticket. In contrast, vacation travelers have a much more elastic demand curve
for opposite reasons. Schedules are much more flexible with this type of passenger,
and less importance is placed on time than price. The more competition from other
carriers, the more price elastic is the demand observed by a single carrier. If there
are three carriers offering similar flights to the same city within twenty minutes of
one another and one carrier offers a lower fare, a passenger is more than likely going
to fly the low-priced carrier.
Air travelers' responsiveness to price changes will play a large rolein the chapters
to come and will be integrated with the concepts of passenger choice, described in
Section 3.3.
Chapter 4
Measurement of Potential Sell
Up Benefits
4.1 A Description of Sell Up
All aspects of seat inventory control are impacted by the reduction in revenues when
a reservation is refused. The benefits associated with acconunodating a passenger
whose initial reservation request is denied are many; not only does the carrier gain
in terms of passenger revenues. but the passenger is given an acceptable itinerary
that suits his or her travel needs.
Sell Up refers to the vertical shift portion of recapture, and occurs when pas-
sengers purchase a ticket at a higher fare class level on the same travel itinerary
originally requested. This phenomenon is highly desirable from an air carrier's
perspective. The airline gains higher revenue from the passenger and the costs of
carrying this passenger remain at the same level regardless of which fare class is
purchased (in the coach cabin). The carrier is also able to fill an additional seat on
a givep flight. Thus, the airline increases its profits by the amount of the difference
in the two fare class values.
For example. if the value of the original fare class requested sis F, and the
variable costs of carrying an incremental passenger is C, total profits, or contribution
to fixed costs to the carrier in carrying an "L" class passenger would be:
Profit = IIL = FL - C (4.1)
If seats are unavailable in "L" class, and the passenger is willing to purchase a ticket
on the same flight itinerary at the higher fare class "K", the profit gained by the
carrier becomes:
UHK = FK - C (4.2)
Costs of carrying the passenger, C, remain the same regardless of which fare class
in the coach cabin is purchased. The difference in profits to the carrier resulting
from the sell up into "K" class is:
UK -UTL = FK - FL = AFKL (4.3)
Thus. the increase in profit to the airline is simply the difference in the fare class
values, or the difference between "L" and "K" class fares.
The benefits to an airline of achieving sell up are obvious. The ability to increase
revenues without affecting costs is a simple way to increase overall airline profits.
How prevalent is sell up? Does it occur in every market? If not, which markets
have a high occurrence of sell up and why? These are some of the questions to be
addressed in this chapter and the chapters that follow.
4.2 Predicting the Occurrence of Sell Up
The larger the passenger choice set, the more difficult it is to predict sell up poten-
tial. One way of measuring sell tip potential would be through the direct survey of
passengers. Mlypothetical situations could be presented to passengers surveyed, for
instance, in a given airport. As an example, passengers would be asked what their
course of action would be if their current itinerary package were not available (i.e.
sold out). A variety of options would be presented to the persons surveyed, in the
form of different travel itineraries. Each itinerary would, in effect, represent either
a vertical shift, horizontal shift, or a booking loss to the original air carrier. The
proportion of those passengers stating they would be willing to pay a higher price
for the same travel itinerary would be the proportion of passengers willing to "sell
up".
The Air Transport Committee of the Canadian Transport Commission (CTC),
as part of an investigation of low priced air fares, performed a direct passenger survey
of domestic (Canadian) scheduled air passengers using deeply discounted fares. The
survey was conducted at Toronto and Vancouver airports over a three-week period
in August of 1982. Passengers were asked (on a survey form) what their course
of action would be if their current type of discount fare had not been available
to them. Various alternative options were presented to the passengers surveyed,
including the purchase of a higher priced ticket (a vertical or a horizontal shift), air
travel to another destination (either a horizontal shift or a booking loss to an air
carrier), travel on another mode of transportation, and the option of not traveling
at all (the latter two of which would represent booking losses). The purpose of this
survey was to explore the impact of deeply-discounted, weakly constrained air fare
products from the point of view of traffic diversion and stimulation. It must be
noted, however, that this survey incorporated travel on several carriers, and was
not done for the purpose of measuring vertical shifts on a specific air carrier. The
results of this study yielded stimulation/diversion rates for the three-week survey
period.[6]
While the relative cost of performing such a survey would be low, its accuracy
can be questioned. Passenger responses to such a survey are likely to be different
from actual behavior. While the CTC survey yielded stimulation/diversion rates for
different fare types, it would be difficult to incorporate this type of survey to include
the measure of vertical shifts. To do so, one would have to find a way to present
alternative available flight itineraries to a passenger, in order for the passenger to
formulate a choice set and make a decision among itinerary/fare class packages.
Reliable estimates of sell up are unlikely to come from this type of a survey.
Perhaps the most accurate way to estimate the proportion of passengers ac-
cepting vertical shifts would be to directly monitor reservation calls. In doing so,
an airline could directly observe passenger behavior as alternate itineraries are pre-
sented, given that the passenger is denied an initial request. The proportion of those
passengers accepting vertical shifts could be tabulated in a fairly accurate way.
Unfortunately, this method would require much time and effort to be expended
observing and monitoring phone lines. A significant amount of elapsed time would
be required for data collection due to the relatively low frequency of sell up op-
portunities. The costs of performing this type of study would be high in terms of
the labor required to effectively monitor reservation calls. This method could also
prove to be unreliable. Passengers frequently make a reservation in a higher fare
class on their desired itinerary (accepting a vertical shift), only to seek lower fares
on other carriers (resulting in a booking loss to the original carrier). It is possible
for a passenger to make reservations on several air carriers, ultimately choosing the
itinerary which best suits his/her travel needs. The existence of wait lists' serves
to further complicate the matter of monitoring reservation calls.
A - wait list" For a givoii fliliI /fare cla, package. where the pnssenger is given n reservaiioi ir
I'l nIllat I ion, eriir from a eners aooready bo ked on the flight.
American Airlines conducted a pilot study at one of their reservation offices
to observe what they refer to as " recapture behavior".[1] Recall that recapture
behavior is defined by American as the likelihood that a customer whose initial
reservation is refused makes a subsequent request on the same airline. It was their
belief that recapture can be estimated by redistributing demand from a closed or
canceled flight. This study did not give passengers the opportunity to perform
vertical shifts; the simulation involved the closing of entire flights rather than the
closing of specific fare classes on a given flight. Therefore, passengers were not given
the option of purchasing a ticket in a higher fare class for the same flight itinerary.
American Airlines' study was performed on an extremely small scale. To reduce
the time required to collect data through call monitoring, recapture opportunities
were created by simulating the closings of flights. A consumer who made a call to the
designated reservation office would first choose a preferred flight (or the preferred
itinerary in his or her choice set). The consumer would then be informed that the
flight was closed and would be hypothetically "wait-listed", or put on a waiting
list for the flight. Alternate flight offerings were then given to the consumer. The
consumer's desired choices were recorded. The option of booking on the initial
preferred flight was then ultimately given to the consumer.
While only thirty sample calls were monitored, the results were somewhat con-
sistent. In general, consumers were extremely flexible in terms of departure time
and much more sensitive to changes in fares. Seventy percent of those surveyed
were flexible up to four hours around the desired departure time, and thirty percent
were flexible within one or two days of the desired departure time.[1] It is difficult
to copclude that the consumers surveyed by American Airlines were a good, rep-
resentative sample of airline passengers due to the small sample size. Any specific
inferences about the rate of recapture cannot be made from the reAilts of the pilot
study. The fact-that consumers were more flexible relative to travel times indicates
that those surveyed in this study were less time-sensitive than price-sensitive.
A large scale study of this type with simulated class closings as opposed to flight
closings could be extremely effective in the measurement of sell up potential. It
would be necessary to monitor different types of markets, both those with a high
proportion of business travelers and a high proportion of leisure travelers. Acquiring
a good passenger mix would yield a more representative sample of overall market
demand and its relation to recapture rates, or the probability of sell up, depending
upon which statistic is desired.
Unfortunately, this type of survey cannot be performed in a travel agency en-
vironient and could only be done from an airline's reservation department. Flight
availability displays are generally biased towards the airline in question when reser-
vat ion requests are made directly to a specific carrier. Any estimates of the recapture
rate using surveys performed solely in an individual carrier's reservation department
woild most likely be too large. If it is difficult to accurately predict sell up behavior
using passenger surveys, what other methods of predicting this occurrence exist?
The issue of passenger choice shifts was incorporated into a seat inventory man-
agenient model developed by Peter Belobaba in his doctoral thesis[2], published in
1987. Belobaba developed a model in conjunction with Western Airlines, referred to
as the Expected Marginal Seat Revenue Model (EMSR Model). The model consists
of a revenue optimization procedure which is used to set and revise fare class book-
ing liiiits for future flights, by departure. It attempts to maximize flight revenues
bv determining the oPtimal number of seats to be authorized for sale in each indi-
vidual fare class. These seats are "nested","or structured such that a high revenue
fare request (e.g. "Y" Class), will not be refused as long as any seats remain in the
lower fare classes. Inputs to this model are historical demand data, average fares,
and current bookings.
The EMSR model was extended to include the possibility of vertical choice shifts
in the booking process. Only the probability of vertical choice shifts, P(v), or the
sell up probability, was considered in the model which manages seat inventory on
a single flight leg. While horizontal shifts, P(h), are often of interest to an airline
in terms of keeping passengers within the carrier, in order to simplify matters,
only revenues on an individual flight basis were considered. Thus, the model was
formulated on a micro (individual flight) rather than a macro (total carrier) revenue
basis. Vertical shifts from one fare class to the next highest fare class were assumed
to be the only shifts that occur. A vertical shift of two or more fare classes was
therefore considered unlikely.
Output from the EMSR model is the optimal number of seats to be protected
for the use of the highest fare class, and in turn for each successively lower fare
class in a nested manner. If the potential for sell up exists, there is a probability
that a passenger who is refused a seat in one fare class will request a seat in the
next higher fare class. For example, if "B" Class is directly below "Y" Class in
terms of relative cost, the probability PB(v) is the probability that a passenger will
vertically shift to the next higher fare class, "Y" Class, upon being denied a seat
in "B" Class. Probability values would exist for each successively lower fare class,
PAI(v), PH(v), PQ(v), PK(v), and PL(v), in order of descending relative cost. In
his thesis, Belobaba addressed how these probabilities can be incorporated into the
EMSR model in order to take into account the potential for revenue in a fare class
if the class below it is closed.(2]
Including vertical shift probability values into the EMSR model serves to increase
the protection levels for each of the higher fare classes. Each lower fare class will
have its booking limit value decrease by the incremental level of protection required
to account for the possibility of vertical choice shifts. The relative magnitude of this
increase in seats protected for the higher fare classes depends on the magnitude of
the probability value; if PB(v) is high. then the number of seats to be protected for
"Y" class will increase by a larger amount than if P(v)B is low. This shows the
importance of the estimation of the Pi(v) values.
Unfortunately, the model actually tested at Western Airlines was a basic version
of the EMSR modcI, which did not incorporate the probability of vertical shifts into
its formulation. The effectiveness of this proposed version of the model incorporating
sell up probabilities has yet to be tested.
One of the difficulties involved with implementing such a model into an actual
reservations system lies in the estimation of the P(v) values. How can one obtain
accurate estimates of these probability values? Historical booking data can be used
to estimate Pi(v) values by observing past instances of sell up behavior. The best
that can be done, however, is the inference of these sell up probabilities; their true
values cannot be determined.
Sell up probability values will be different on a flight by flight basis. In order
to increase sell up opportunities, it is important to identify those flights with high
sell up potential. Some flights will have a high occurrence of sell up; others will not
have any instance of it. Sell up potential is founded in consumer choice theory. Each
passenger has his/her own sell up potential for a given flight itinerary, independent
of overall flight demand. In general, however, sell up will be prevalent on high
demand fliglhts. On these flight itineraries, a passenger is more likely to be denied
an initial itinerary/fare class request. Thus, while an individual's sell up potential
is unaffected by overall demand for a flight, the necessity to perform some type of
a shift increases with increasing flight demand. Those flights with historically high
demand levels should therefore have a higher overall sell up potential than those
that typically experience lower demand levels. Sell up probabilities will fluctuate on
a seasonal, monthly, weekly, and daily basis due to fluctuations in demand. Peak
travel periods such as major holidays will have a higher potential for sell up than off-
season travel times. Similarly, heavily traveled days of week such as Monday flights
in a predominantly business travel market will have more of a sell up potential than
a day such as Saturday, which usually experiences low levels of demand for business
travel.
It is possible for a passenger to shift two or more fare classes, instead of just one
fare class, as assumed previously. Thus, if "M" class is sold out, it is possible for a
consumer to purchase a "Y" class ticket instead of shifting only one fare class and
purchasing a "B" class ticket. Possible explanations for this occurrence could be
the dislike of the restrictions imposed on "B" class tickets, the ability to potentially
upgrade to business or first class with a "Y" class ticket, or simply because "B"
class is sold out.
In general, a larger probability exists for sell up in fare classes of a higher revenue
value. This can be explained by the passenger types which purchase different fare
class tickets. Business travelers, who are normally less price sensitive and more time
sensitive, would be the most likely to accept a vertical shift. In doing so, they are
able tto travel on the same flight initially requested, but will be paying a higher
price. These travelers are more apt to purchase tickets in higher fare classes due
to the nature of their travel. 2 In contrast, leisure travelers are less likely to sell up
due to their high price sensitivity and flexibility in terms of time of travel. These
passengers aremore likely to accept horizontal shifts or represent booking losses to
the air carrier in their search for the lowest possible fares. Leisure travelers typically
puirchase tickets in lower fare classes due to this price sensitivity. Thus, it can be
hypothesized that:
PB(v )> PAf(v) > PH(V) > Pq(v ) > PK(t?) > PL(t') (4.4)
becaise passengers requesting tickets in higher fare classes are more likely to sell
up. Markets which have a large proportion of business travelers often generate a
higher probability for sell up in the higher fare classes than leisure markets due to
this plhenonena.
Highly competitive markets have a lower sell up potential compared to those
markets which are dominated by one or a few carriers. The reasoning behind this
statement is simple; if a fare class is closed to a consumer and many other options
exist (as in a highly competitive market), the chance of that consumer shifting to a
(lifferent flight itinerary is high. The probability of a vertical shift in a competitive
market is low due to the numerous other itinerary options available to a passenger.
If the market is dominated by one carrier or relatively few carriers, the passenger
will be more likely to perform a vertical shift if the initially requested itinerary is
unavailable, simply because not as many other options exist.
In summary, when trying to identify flights with high sell up potential, the
following general guidelines can be followed:
1. The flight should experience historically high demand levels.
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2. A larger proportion of business travelers increases the probability of sell up.
3. A large amount of competition from other carriers serves to decrease sell up
potential. Thus, the carrier in question should be a fairly dominant carrier in
the flight's market.
Note that it is not necessary for all of these guidelines to be fulfilled in order for a
market to have sell up potential. The above statements simply represent a summary
of general criteria for identifying sell up potential on a market basis.
4.3 Revenue Impact Measurements
Once flights that have the potential for sell up have been identified, a sell up policy,
or strategy can be implemented into the reservations system. This sell up policy
would serve to induce vertical choice shifts, with the intent of increasing overall flight
revenues. Before implementing such a strategy, it is important to test what kind of
an impact the sell up policy will have on passenger bookings and most importantly,
overall flight revenues.
To test the effects of a potential sell up policy, a revenue impact test can be
performed on those flights targeted to have a sell up strategy implemented. This
impact test compares the overall flight revenues of two types of flights in the same
market, a sell up flight, s, and a control flight, c. The sell up fight(s), s, is the flight
for which the proposed sell up policy will be implemented. The control flight(s), c,
will be managed using ordinary seat inventory control methods described in Section
2.6. This flight will be used as a comparison to test the revenue impact of the sell
up strategy. The two flights types must exhibit as many similarities as possible.
For example, it is essential that both traverse the same origin and 4estination pair.
Other similarities must exist, such as the samae flight number across different days
of the week, or the same flight number and day of week across different weeks. In
any case, in order to minimize revenue differences due to fluctuations in demand
across different flights, the sell up flight and the control flight must contain as many
idenitical characteristics as possible.
The idea of using a control flight is akin to the case control method used in many
medical studies. The idea is to pair two individuals with "identical" characteristics
who only differ in a single relevant variable. The revenue impact test attempts to
do this in using a sell up flight and a control flight, with the only difference between
the two being the seat inventory control procedure used. It must be noted, however,
that as in the case control method, stochastic variability in demand between the sell
up flight and the control flight will occur since the flights are drawn from random
samples. Revenue impact measurements described in this section will attempt to
minimize these differences. It is possible, however, for variations in demand not due
to the sell up strategy to exist between the two comparison flights. These demand
variations could influence revenue results.
In general. the revenue earned R k, on a particular flight k, in fare class m, will
be:
0
RM =fm E b k (4.5)
j=J
where f,, represents the fare value in class m, and b, 1 represents bookings accepted
in class in, day j prior to departure, on flight k. J is the first day that a reservation
is booked in class in (e.g. if the first reservation to be booked in "M" Class is sixty
days prior to departure. J = 60), and these bookings will continue to Day 0, which
is the day the flight departs. Thus, the revenue earned by class is the fare value of
the class multiplied by the total daily revenue bookings received in that class.
Total revenue for a flight, Rk , can be expressed as a sum of the revenues earned
by class:
M M 0
R 0  = R'= >Z(fm E bk ) (4.6)
m=1 m=1 j=J
To test the revenue impact difference, AR between two flights, where k is equal to
either s, the sell up flight or c, the control flight,
ARtot = R - Ric0  (4.7)
M
- S (R1, - Rc) (4.8)
M = 1
Af 0
- S (fm 5(bV - ic,)) (4.9)
m = 1 j=J
Thus, the total revenue difference between the sell up flight and the control flight
is the difference between the revenue values of each flight. The revenue impact,
AR, can be expressed on a class by class basis if necessary. If the sell up policy is
successful and produces an improvement in overall flight revenues, positive benefits
will be incurred, and ARtot will be greater than zero. In contrast, if the policy yields
negative benefits, the value of ARtot, will be less than zero. To sumn, if
R0a > Rc0 t (4.10)
then the sell up strategy has been effective in that it has improved flight revenues.
On the other hand, if
RO , < R!,c (4.11)
flight revenues decreased with the implementation of the sell up policy.
4n example of a potential sell up strategy would be to close "M" class seven
days prior to the sell up flight's departure. Passengers requesting reservations in
"M" class from Day 7 to Day 0 would be denied this option and ,Vould have the
opportunity to sell tip into either "B" class or "Y" class, in ascending fare value
order. It is assumed that lower fare classes ("H", "Q", "K", and "L" classes) are
closed3 to the passenger due to advance purchase restrictions (or due to a nested
reservations system). Seat inventory management on the control flight would be
performed as usual with no premature class closings.
In order to test the impact of this particular sell up policy, an incremental rev-
ennte test can be performed. This test would measure the revenue impact difference
between the sell up flight and the control flight. Differences in flight revenues would
only be measured from Day 7 (j = 7) to Day 0 (j = 0), since this is the time period
during which the sell up strategy is to be implemented. Revenue impact is measured
for Classes "M", "B", and "Y" only. Any lower valued fare classes are considered
closed at Day 7 due to restrictions and it is assuned that these classes' revenues
will not be affected by the proposed sell up policy. Sell up is thus considered for
vertical shifts between Class "M" and Class "B" and also between Class "M" and
Class "Y" (a shift of two fare classes).
The revenue impact difference, AR for this particular flight would be:
0
AR = fy ( (b~y --bcy)+
j=7
0
fB (b*j - bcg j) +
j= 7
0
fm L (b~mj - MWgg (4.12)
Revenue impact difference is thus the sum of the revenue impact differences for
Classes "Y", "B", and "M", which are the classes affected by the sell up strategy.
'3 &odl d t, I, t no a(d;itiinl rerv acins mn he accepted in this fare class
The first and second terms of the above equation will most likely be positively valued
due to sell up from Class "M" to Classes "Y" and "B". The third term will probably
be negative due to the loss in bookings experienced when prematurely closing out
Class "M" of the sell up flight. The question then beconies whether the positive
benefits gained by sell up in "Y" and "B" classes will outweigh the negative benefits
incurred when prematurely closing "M" class of the sell up flight. If
0 0 0
fy S (by1 - byj ) + fB 5 (b', - bc ) > fAr (biq - bcr) (4.13)j=7 j=7 j=7
then
AR > 0
and the sell up flight has yielded more revenue than the control flight. Conversely,
if
0 0 0
fr (by - byg) + fB S (bs - b -) < fr 5 (bs j - birj) (4.14)
j=7 j=7 j= 7
then
AR < 0
and the sell up flight has lost revenue in comparison with the control flight.
The revenue impact difference can be generalized for any given sell up policy as
follows:
M 0
AR 5 (fm 5 (b'.- by,1 )) (4.15)
S= V j=t
where v is the lowest fare class that is affected by the sell up policy and t is the
first day that the sell up policy is implemented. In the previous example, Class v
would be equated to Class "M" because the sell up strategy affected Classes "M"
and higher. Day t in this case is Day 7, the day that Class "M" was closed. Of
course stochastic fluctuations in demand across flights must be taken into account
between the sell up flight(s) and the control flight(s).
The costs of implementing a sell up policy must also be considered. In some
cases, the overall difference in revenue, AR may be positively valued, but of a small
magnitude. A small improvement in flight revenues may be attributed to an outside
cause (such as demand fluctuations) other than the sell up policy. Also, if AR is of
a small magnitude, this slight increase in flight revenues due to a sell up policy may
not offset the costs of implementing such a policy.
4.4 Revenue Slope Changes
To test the incremental revenue between the two types of flights on a class by class
basis, a daily incremental revenue test can be performed. This test measures the
net change in revenues for a flight on a daily basis. The daily change in revenue in
class m evaluated at clay j is denoted as:
A Rj',, = Rl,,5 - Rm,, (4.16)
where the change in revenue is equal to the difference of the revenue values between
lay j and clay j - 1 for class rn.4
The revenue slope change can be determined in a similar fashion, where RS8M1
is the revenue slope change associated with class m on day j of the sell up flight:
R'-=R,',O- in_ ARS7 13 R= - - R'- MIJ. (4.1T)
" R'g_ -M Rj-2 ARI,,g_,
Revenue slope is thus the ratio of the niet change in revenues from day j to day j - 1
to the net change in revenues from day j - 1 to day j - 2. If this value is greater
b ei .:111 haIt Rc,,= fr. Z brn,
than one, the revenue for a particular fare class is increasing at an increasing rate.
A value less than one for RS-1 would indicate fare class m revenues increasing at a
decreasing rate.
The revenue slope change concept can be used in terms of bookings by class as
well:
Bb " _ _ - E_',,,___ - Ab'" (4.18)
B' . '"M~E Jb 1 -- Ei b'n-2 ^ A',g1
where BS,", is the booking slope change associated with class m on day j for the
sell up flight. Daily booking values are substituted for revenue values in Equation
4.17. If BSij > 1.0, the bookings for class m are increasing at an increasing rate.
In contrast if BS;, < 1.0, bookings are increasing at a decreasing rate.
A successful sell up strategy might incorporate slope changes as a method of
evaluating sell up performance. In this way, revenue growth or booking patterns
would be constantly monitored. A revenue slope change greater than one would
indicate that the sell up strategy is proving to be successful on a net revenue basis,
assuming that revenues are increasing at an increasing rate due to sell up. Low
revenue slope change values would serve as a warning signal to re-set booking limits
in order to generate higher revenues in classes which are closed due to a sell up
strategy.
An optimal sell up model would restrict the number of seats in fare classes known
to generate sell up without completely closing out any fare class. In this way, if a
flight experiences uncharacteristically low demand levels, it will still be possible for
some bookings to be made in these fare classes. A model that continuously monitors
slope changes during the booking process could adjust booking limits accordingly.
This would serve to prevent revenue losses due to premature class closings, should
demand levels be lower than expected.
4.5 Price Elasticity Measurements
In general, passengers in each market segment will have different preferences. The
relative importance different travelers will place on fare values will vary according
to trip purpose, times of day, days of week, and weeks of the year. In this section,
we will concentrate on different traveler types for a given flight.
The idea of price elasticities, can be related to the concept of sell up. The price
inelasticity of passengers requesting tickets in higher-priced fare classes results in
a larger probability of sell up. Business travelers who typically purchase tickets in
these fare classes ate willing to pay more for a seat on a given flight. Highly price
elastic leisure travelers are less willing to sell up. This passenger generally purchases
tickets in lower fare classes due to price sensitivity. Just as Equation 4.4 relates sell
up probabilities P,, (v) for a given fare class m, an assumption can be made that
elasticities for a given fare value fmn, eD,f., are related as follows:
0 > eD.fy. > eDjT > eD,fm > CD,fj > ep,fQ > eD,IK > eD,ft (4.19)
Since sell up probabilities increase with increasing fare class values, it can be as-
smnned that fare class elasticities also increase (become less negatively valued) with
increasing fare class values, due to the relation of sell up probabilities to the elas-
ticity concept. Thus, the elasticity of demand with respect to price in fare class
"Y". CD,fy, should be less than the elasticity of demand with respect to price in
fare class "B", eD,f,, and so on, with "L" class having the most negative elasticity
value. Intuitively, this makes sense because passengers requesting tickets in higher
fare classes are more price inelastic than passengers in lower fare classes. Also,
elasticities of demand with respect to price are generally less than zero. Price and
demand generally move in opposite directions. As the price of a product increases,
demand for the product usually decreases.
It is possible to measure passengers' elasticity values for a given set of sell up
flights, s, and control flights, c, described in the previous section. Using average
fare values and booking rates prior to departure, elasticity of demand with respect
to price for a given fare class, eDgm can be determined. These elasticity values will
vary across markets, flight numbers and time of departure.
When a specific fare class is closed due to the imposition of a sell up strategy,
passengers requesting tickets in this fare class m, are denied their requests. In
essence, the price of an originally requested seat is being increased to frn+i, or
the next highest fare class value because the lower fare class value fm is no longer
available. An elasticity value can be obtained, evaluating the change in demand (or
bookings) with a change in price. In order to measure this. it is necessary to have
a sell up flight s, in which a sell up strategy is implemented to prematurely close
down a specific fare class(es), as well as a a control flight c. Those willing to "sell
up" into fare class m + 1 must be isolated in order to evaluate the price elasticity
of fare class m.
In general, arc price elasticity of demand for a particular fare class m can be
expressed as:
eD,fm = -b f, (4.20)A fm bi
Elasticity evaluated at point (fi, bi) is the resulting change in demand or bookings,
Ab. divided by the change in fare class value incurred Af, multiplied by a ratio of
fare yalue to demand at a specific point i.
The value of Af is the difference in fare value between class m and class n + 1:
Af fm+1 - fm (4.21)
The variable Ab is defined as:
0 0
Ab = )2 - b= [ (b+1,j - bm.1,)] - [ b] (4.22)
j J j=J
The first term b2, is the net change in bookings in class m + 1 after Day J (which
is when class in is closed) between the sell up flight a and the control flight c. This
value gives the nunber of passengers who, once denied an initial request in class m,
purchased a ticket in class mt + 1. It is used as a measure of those passengers willing
to perform a vertical shift, or those willing to sell up. Term b, is used to represent
the number of passengers from the sell up flight who would have booked in class in,
had it remained open (as it did in the control flight).
Typically,
b2 - b, < 0 (4.23)
because this term is a proxy for the the net change in passengers due to an increase
in price, which is almost always less than zero. Thus, the value eD,f. is negatively
valued, as expected.
Terms fi and b; are the points at which the elasticity is evaluated, and can be
one of many (ft , bi) combinations. The point (fin, bi) will be used in this thesis, and
price elasticity.of demand for a specific fare class m is as follows:
= _ - bf+ 1.1 )] - = - j(bm)] f(.
(fm+1 - fm) = (b) )
It is possible for one elasticity measure to be related to more than one fare class.
If a sell up strategy, for example, involves closing out Class "H" at Day 14, it is
assumed that sell up will occur from "H" class to "M" class. The price elasticity of
demand for "H" class will try to estimate the change in "H" class passengers due
to a change in the price of "H" class, which is essentially an increase to the price of
a ticket in "M" class. For the purposes of this thesis, the elasticity measure for this
strategy will be denoted as CD,,, but is measured by using information from both
"" and "M" classes.
Price elasticity values by fare class can be used as an indication of whether a
particular sell up strategy will be successful. Fare classes associated with inelastic
price elasticitites (-1.0 < eD.fj < 0.0) will have a higher probability of sell up
occurring. For example, an "H" class elasticity of -0.5 indicates that passengers from
"H" class have a strong probability of selling up to "M" class due to passengers' price
insensitivities. Elastic price elasticities (eD,/m < -1-0) imply a weak probability
for sell up. A "K" class elasticity of -2.5 should be associated with a low sell up
probability from "K" class to "Q" class, as a result of travelers' price sensitivities.
The estimation of price elasticities for air travel is extremely complex. It is
difficult to come up with standard price elasticity values by fare class because values
will fluctuate across markets, flights, and time. With the implementation of a sell
up strategy, it is possible to measure price elasticity values for certain fare classes,
depending upon what type of strategy is implemented. The following chapter will
attempt to estimate price elasticities for certain fare classes, on a flight by flight
basis.
Chapter 5
Assessment of Sell Up
Having developed a method of measuring the revenue impact of sell up, we will now
examine the application of a sell up strategy in an actual airline environment. The
impact of this strategy will be measured and an overall assessment of the potential
benefits and costs of sell up will be made.
5.1 Description of Test Methodology and Results
A successful sell up policy has the potential to increase airline revenues without
substantially increa*ing operating costs, thus increasing overall airline profits. The
question becomes how to accurately predict markets/flights with high sell up po-
tent ial. Within those flights with sell up opportunities, a decision must be made as
to what type of sell up policy to impose.
Under a research agreement with Delta Air Lines, a sell up strategy was devel-
oped and tested in the fall of 1989 and the spring of 1990 on a select group of flights.
The purpose of the study was to address the issue of passenger choice shifts during
the booking process. -As shown in Chapter 3, the unavailability of a desired flight
and fare class to a consumer can lead to:
1. A vertical choice shift, or a shift to a higher fare class on the same flight.
2. A horizontal choice shift, or a shift to a different flight on the same air carrier.
:3. A booking loss to the airline, or a decision to travel on another carrier, another
mode type, or not to travel at all.
The prevalence of sell up, or specifically vertical choice shifts, was studied and an as-
sessment was made on the overall revenue impact of the sell up policy implemented.
5.1.1 Preliminary Study
A small scale preliminary study was performed on a select group of flights to initially
determine the impact of sell up. Ten flight markets were selected for the study. All
flights chosen experienced historically high demand levels. Expected demand levels
for each flight number were high enough to cause fare class booking limits to be
reached in one or more fare classes.
A test week was designated for the study and two days of departure for each
flight were chosen as test flights. The test flights were similar in that both traversed
the same origin-destination pair and had the same flight number across different
days of the week. The identification of flight pairs valid for comparison was done
by choosing days of week which experienced similar historical demand levels. Two
actions to be taken were distributed among the test flights:
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The single point sell up flights were those flights in which the sell up policy
was imposed. For the purposes of this preliminary study, a uniform policy was
implemented on all test flights in this category. The sell up policy was as follows:
" Close "K" Class at Day 21
" Close "H" Class at Day 14
Thus., passengers requesting reservations in "K" class from Day 21 to Day 0 were
denied the option and would have the potential to sell up into a higher fare class.
Similarly, passengers requesting a reservation in "H" class from Day 7 to Day 0
would also be denied the opportunity. For a description of the fare class structures
used in this thesis, see Section 2.5.
Seat inventory control on the automated control flights was performed as usual
using the carrier's automated optimization system. No premature class closings
were imposed on these flights. This category of flights was to be used in the revenue
impact measurements for the purpose of testing the revenue effect of the sell up
policy.
Actions to be taken were distributed evenly among the two groups. Thus, a
proportionate amount of each day of week received each treatment type. All ten
flights to be tested received each of the treatments, resulting in a total of twenty
flights to be examined.
Daily reports were made on the booking histories of all flights. Once the test
flights departed, a complete booking history for the flight was made available. An
example of this can be seen in Table 5.1. Total bookings by fare class for each
.HISTORICAL BOOKING DATA
CITY PAIR: MCI / ATL
DAYS SEATS BDDKED TOT
PRIOR 1B -BB MB HB QB KB LB BKD
4
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
24
25.46
9:30
34
34
34
33
33
33
33
33
33
33
33
33
33
33
33
33
33
33
33
33
28
28
28
28
26
25
24
24
24
4
6 105
6 102
5 103
5 99
5 97
5 89
5 88
5 88
5 88
5 87
5 86
5 89
5 64
5 83
5 83
5 81
5 77
5 76
5 72
5 68
5 59
5 58
5 58
6 57
6 54
6 52
6 50
S 49
6 49
5 48
5 47
Table 5.1: Booking History for a Departed Flight. Day 30 to Day 0
departed flight can be extracted for any selected range of days prior to departure.
In this case, data is listed from Day 30 to Day 0 (or departure date) for a flight
from Kansas City (MCI) to Atlanta (ATL). For example, it can be determined that
from Day 21 to Day 0 in "Y" class, a net gain of 21 bookings was realized. It is
impossible to tell the actual number of bookings accepted and canceled within this
period, however. Only the net gain or loss in bookings can be determined from this
information.
5.1.2 Preliminary Test Results
Out of the ten flight numbers tested, four had to be eliminated due to large group
reservations made early in the booking process or unexpectedly low demand levels.
This left six valid flight comparisons in which to measure the impact of the sell up
strategy.
Table 5.2 lists the six valid flight comparisons. For each flight pair listed, the
fare class mix of passengers and the percentage difference in flight revenues (single
point sell up over automated control) are shown. The passenger mix is the number
of coach class bookings at Day 0.
The % Difference from Control value reflects the difference in total coach class
revenues of the single point sell up flight over the automated control flight. Thus, a
positive value indicates that the sell up flight had a higher total revenue value than
the control flight. Conversely, a negative percentage difference reflects that the sell
up flight had a lower total revenue value. For example, the ATLBOS single point sell
up flight yielded 29 percent lower coach class revenues than the automated control
flight. Actual revenue values have been omitted for reasons of data confidentiality.
ACTIJ
MAPKET TAKEN
LGAATL AUTOATED CNTRCL
SINGLE POINT 5ELLUP
ATLEOS AUTOATED CONTIRL
SINGLE POINT SELLUP
LAXSi AUVTO1ATED CNThDL
SINGLE POINT SELLUP
STLATL AU7D0ATED CDNTROL
SINGLE POINT CELLUP
ONTAT AUTOMATED CONTROL
SINGLE POINT SELLUP
MCIATL AUTOMATED CNTRCL
SINGtE POINT SELLUIP
N H 9 K L TOTAL CONTROL
-4.-36.
-29. 30%
-58.59%
18.21%
-24.03%
-24.82.
Table 5.2: Preliminary Sell Up Test Results
It can he seen from Table 5.2 that only one flight pair exhibits a positive per-
centage difference value, indicating that only one sell up flight yielded higher coach
class revenues than the corresponding control flight. To further assess the revenue
impact of the sell up policy, a revenue impact test was performed on each of the six
flight pairs. The incremental revenue test, described in Section 4.3, measures the
revenue impact difference between the sell up flight and the control flight. In this
test case, differences in flight revenues would only be measured from Day 21 to Day
0. since this is the time period during which the sell up strategy was implemented.
Revenue impact is only measured for Classes "H", "M", "Q", and "K", the only
classes assumed to be affected by the sell up policy. Sell up of more than one fare
class wlas not considered in this case.
The incremental revenue impact test is important because it serves to screen
1 DIFF. FROMCOACH BOOKINGS BY CLASS
out any differences in booking levels between the sell up flight and the control flight
prior to the implementation of the sell up test. The difference in bookings after the
sell up test is implemented is the basis of the incremental revenue test. This test
is thus a more relevant measure of revenue differences due to the imposition of the
sell up policy.
The revenue impact difference, AR, for this set of preliminary test flights would
be:
0 0
AR = fm (b - big ) + fH 5 (bs - b4y.) +
j=14 j=14
0 0
fQ S (b"j - b ) + fK Ks(b _c 1 ) (5.1)
j=21 j=21
Revenue impact difference is thus the sum of the revenue impact differences for
Classes "M" and "H" from Day 14 to Day 0, because the sell up policy closed class
"H" at Day 14 to try to induce sell up into Class "M". Also included is the sum of
the revenue impact differences between Classes "Q" and "K" from Day 21 to Day
0, because "K" class was closed at Day 21 in order to induce sell up into "Q" class.
Results of the incremental revenue test, performed on Classes "M", "H", "Q",
and "K" were fairly consistent in that on all six pairs of test flights, the revenue
impact of the sell up policy was negative. The automated control flights thus yielded
higher incremental revenues than the single point sell up flights using equation 5.1,
ticket fare values, and daily booking information.
Table 5.3 shows the results of the incremental revenue test for the LGAATL
and the MCIATL markets. The net change in bookings is the difference in bookings
between the time the sell up strategy affected a specific class and Day 0. For example
in the LGAATL market, the change in bookings for "H" class is the difference in
TOTAL
REVENUE
HARKET ACTION REVENUE INPACT IMPACT
TAKEN M H a K M THROUSH K
LGAATL AUTOMATED CONTROL $528 $2,389 $2,15 $0 $5,032.
SINGLE POINT SELL UP $1,584 s0 $0 $0 $1,84
$1,056 ($2,389) ($2,115) $0 ($3, 448)
NCIATL AUTOMATED CONTROL $1,248 $748 $2,695 $812 $5,502
SINGLE POINT SELL UP $3,744 $299 6476 $232 $4,751
$2,496 ($449) $2,219) ($580) ($75 )
Table 5.3: Preliminary Sell Up Test: Incremental Revenue Impact Results
bookings from Day 14 to Day 0. The revenue impact is the change in bookings
multiplied by the average posted fare value for the class. The total revenue impact
value is listed in the final column below the individual revenue impact values for the
sell up and control flights.
In general. sell up was more prevalent from Class "H" to Class "M" than from
Class "Q" to Class "K". Two examples of this can be seen from the revenue difference
values on a class by class basis, listed in Table 5.3. For example, the MCIATL
flight had a negative revenue difference value for "Q" class, but a positive revenue
difference value for "M" class. Sell up occurred in this market in the higher fare
class, but was not apparent in the case of the lower fare classes. Negative values
for "K" and "H" classes are to be expected due to the premature closings of these
classes (at Day 21 and Day 14, respectively).
It is necessary to realize the importance of judging sell up from an incremental
revenue basis as opposed to just looking at the increase in bookings incurred. This
can be seen when looking at results from the LGAATL flight. While some sell up
exists from Class "H" to Class "M", the revenue gained does not offset the revenue
lost by prematurely closing "H" class at Day 14. Thus, while it can be said that sell
up exists on this flight from Class "H" to Class "M", in this case, sell up has not
been beneficial in terms of flight revenues. In contrast, the MCIATL market shows
a beneficial case of sell up from "H" class to "M" class. The revenue gained in "M"
class does offset the revenue lost by prematurely closing "H" class. Total revenue
impact was still negative for this flight, however, due to the negative impacts of the
sell up strategy for Classes "K" and "Q".
Appendix A contains graphs of the daily booking information for Classes "M",
"H", "Q", and "K" of the LGAATL and MCIATL markets. The predominance of
sell up from Class "H" to Class "M" can be seen in both markets. For example,
in the LGAATL market it can be seen that sell up has occurred in "M" class from
Day 14 to Day 0, judging from the differences in bookings between the sell up flight
and the control flight. On the other hand, no sell up is apparent in "Q" class
between bookings in the sell up flight and the control flight from Day 21 to Day
0. Graphs of Classes "H" and "K" reveal how the sell up policy served to restrict
bookings in these classes. For example, the MCIATL flight's "H" class graph shows
a pronounced difference between bookings for the sell up flight versus those of the
control flight. These additional bookings were made between Day 21 and Day 0,
when "H" class of the sell up flight was closed out. Revenue difference values for
this flight pair in "H" class also reflect this loss.
From this preliminary study, it can be concluded that:
1. Any sell up policy should be initiated on a flight by flight basis. Sell up does
not exist on all flights.
2. Arbitrary sell up (Close "K" class on Day 21, "H" class on Day 14) had an
overall negative revenue impact (i.e. revenue gained through sell up was less
than revenue lost by closing "K" and "H" classes prematurely).
3. It is important to judge sell up potential on a net revenue impact basis, rather
than on the basis of incremental bookings.
4. Sell up appears to be more prevalent in higher fare classes, as presumed in
Chapter 4.
5.1.3 Expanded Study
A large scale sell up test was developed to further study the impact of sell up. In
this case, eleven flight markets, or origin-destination pairs were selected. Again, all
of these flight markets experienced historically high demand levels. Two flights a
day in each market were selected on the basis of having expected demand levels high
enough to cause fare class booking limits to be reached in one or more fare classes.
Two test weeks were designated for the study. Two days of departure a week
for each flight were chosen as test flights, for a total of forty-four flights a week to
be included in the study, or eighty-eight departures total for the two week period.
Once again, actions to be taken were as follows:
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MARKET FLIGHT WEEK DAY OF WEEK ACTION TAKEN
ATLBOS A 1 Tuesday AUTOMATED CONTROL
1 Wednesday SINGLE POINT SELL UP
2 Tuesday SINGLE POINT SELL UP
2 Wednesday AUTOMATED CONTROL
B 1 Tuesday SINGLE POINT SELL UP
1 Wednesday AUTOMATED CONTROL
2 Tuesday AUTOMATED CONTROL
2 Wednesday SINGLE POINT SELL UP
Table 5.4: Example of Actions to be Taken, Two Week Study
Actions were distributed evenly across flight numbers, days of week, and across
the two week period. An example of how these actions to be taken were distributed
can be seen in Table 5.4 for a given flight market, Atlanta-Boston. From this, one
can see that it is possible to compare test results (of the sell up flight versus the
control flight) from the same flight number across the same week (Flight A, Week
1, Tuesday vs. Flight A, Week 1 Wednesday) or the same flight number and day
of week across weeks (Flight A, Week 1, Tuesday vs. Flight A, Week 2, Tuesday).
Comparisons of different flight numbers across the same day (Flight A, Week 1,
Tuesday vs. Flight B, Week 1, Tuesday) were found to be unreliable due to varying
fluctuations in demand across flight numbers. With this expanded study, it was
possible to obtain a larger-scale comparison of sell up flight results versus control
flight results.
As in the preliminary study, the single point sell up flights are those flights in
which the sell up strategy was imposed. In this case, a sell up policy was developed
for each individual market, tailored according to historical demand levels for the
market. When and in what classes in which to impose sell up was determined on
GROUP MARKET
I ATLBOS
BOSATL
II ATLLAX
LGAATL
ATLDCA
DFWATL
ATLGSP
GSPATL
III LGAFLL
ATLMLB
MLBATL
SELL UP ACTION
FARE CLASS DAY CLOSED
K,L 42
H 14
B 7
K,L 21
H 14
B 7
K,L
H
Table 5.5: Sell Up Policies Developed on an Individual Market Basis
an individual market basis. Table 5.5 lists each of the eleven test markets and the
corresponding sell up strategies imposed on the single point sell up flights. Similar
demand histories resulted in the formulation of three different sell up policies. and
three market "groups".
For example, in the ATLBOS market. a high demand market with a large number
of business passengers, the sell up policy involved closing "K" and "L" classes six
weeks in advance to induce sell up to "Q" class, closing "H" class at Day 14 to force
sell up into "M" class, and closing "B" class at Day 7 in order to induce sell up into
"Y" class. In contrast, the LGAFLL market is dominated by vacation travelers,
and thus the sell up strategy only incorporated prematurely closing the lower fare
(lassts "L", "K". and "H", at Day 21 for the first two classes, and Day 7 for the
latter fare class.
5.1.4 Expanded Study Results
Table 5.6 highlights revenue results of the expanded study incorporating eleven mar-
kets and forty-four total flights. The table serves as a comparison of the single point
sell up flight to the automated control flight in terms of flight revenues. Appendix
B documents booking results of the expanded study, showing the fsge class mix of
passengers in coach class.
The % Difference Same Week value compares the coach class revenue value of
the sell up flight with the control flight of the same week. For example, in the
ATLBOS market, a comparison is made between the automated control Flight A,
Week 1 with the single point sell up Flight A, Week 1. In this case, the sell up flight
had twenty-two percent lower coach class revenues than the control flight. The %
Difference Across Weeks value compares revenue values of the single point sell up
flight with the automated control flight across different weeks. For the ATLBOS
market a comparison is made between Flight A, Week 1 which yielded nineteen
percent lower coach revenues than the sell up Flight A, Week 2. Thus, a positive
percentage value in these two columns would indicate that the sell up flight had a
higher coach class revenue value than the control flight, with a negative percentage
value indicating that the sell up flight had a lower revenue value. Again, comparisons
were not made across different flight numbers due to fluctuations in demand.
It is apparent from Table 5.6 that relatively few flight pairs exhibit positive per-
centage differences, when compared in the same week or across weeks. Fourteen
out of a possible forty-four percentage difference values for the same week compar-
ison are positive, indicating higher revenue values for the sell up flight than the
control flight. Twelve out of forty-four percentage difference values for the across
DEP.
MARKET FLIGHT WEEK
ATLBOS A I
1
2
2
2
ATLLAX A I
1
2
~2
B 1
2
2
2LGAATL A 1
2
2
2
2
NL A TL A I
2
2 I
B i
L~r~~ 1 I
2
2 1
ACTION
TAKEN
AUTOMATED CONTROL
SINGLE POINT SELLUP
SINGLE POINT SELLUP
AUTOMATED CONTROL
SINGLE POINT SELLUP
AUTOMATED CONTROL
AUTOMATED CONTROL
SINGLE POINT SELLLP
AUTOMATED CONTROL
SINGLE POINT SELUP
SINGLE POINT SELLUP
AUTOMATED CONTROL
SINGLE POINT SELLUP
AUTOMATED CONTROL
AUTOMATED CONTROL
SINGLE POINT SELLUP
SINGLE POINT SELLUP
AUTOMATED CONTROL
AUTOMATED CONTROL
SINGLE POINT SELLUP
AUTOMATED CO ROL
SINGLE POINT SELLUP
SINGLE POINT SELLUP
AUTOMATED CONTROL
AUTOMATED CONTROL
SINGLE POINT SELLUP
SINGLE POINT SELLUP
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SINGLE POINT SELLUP
AUTOMATED CONTROL
AUTOMATED CONTROL
SINGLE POINT SELLUP
SINGLE POINT SELUP2
AUTDMATED CONTROL
AUTOMATED CONTROL
SINGLE POINT SELLUP
AUTOMATED CONTROL
SINGLE EOINT SELLUP
SINGLE POINT SELLUP
AUTMATED CONTROL
AUTCMATED CONTROL
SINGLE POINT SELLUP
SINGLE POINT SELLUP
AUTOMATE CONTROL
SINGLE POINT SELLUP
AUTiMIATED ONTRCL
AUTOMATED CONTROL
SINGLE :OINT SELLUP
I DIFF
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WEEK
-22.06%
-51.051
-9.46%
16.51%
5.47%
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-41.06%
-19.701
-7.03%
123.71%
27.001
-30.411
-33. 91
-0.791
-16.34%
-36.69%
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-29.201
-35.680%
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46.94%
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WEEKS
-19.121
-52.821
EP.
MAR FLIGHT MEEK
ATLGSP
12.401
-0.241
23.36%
-28-32%
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84.251
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-7.957
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7.53%
-40.151
-11.51%
-9.631
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-17.06%
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1
2
2
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2
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2
2
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2
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2
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2
2
B I
1
2
2
B I
2
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ACTION
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SINGLE POINT SELLUP
AUTONATED CONTROL
AUTOMATED CONTROL
SINGLE POINT SELLUP
AUTOMATED CONTROL
SINGLE POINT SELLUP
SINGLE POINT SEPLL
AUTMATED CONTROL
AUTOMATED CONTROL
SIMLE POINT SELLUP
SINGLE POINT SELLUP
AUATED CONTROL
SImLE POINT SELLUP
AUONATED CONTROL
AUTONATED CONTROL
SINGLE POINT SELLUP
SIMLE POINT SELLUP
AUTOMNTED CONTROL
AUTOMNATED CONTROL
SINE POW SELLUP
AUTINATED CONTROL
SINGLE POINT SELLIJP
SINGLE POINT SELLUP
AUTOMATED CON1TROL
AUTOMATED CONTROL
SINGLE POINT SELUP
SINGLE POINT SELLUP
AUTOMATED CONTROL
SINGLE POINT SELLUP
ARMATED CONTROL
AUTOMATED COXTROL
SINGLE POINT SELLUP
SINGLE POINT SEPLCF
AUTOMATED CONTROL
AUTOMATED CONTROL
SINGLE POINT SELUP
AUTOMATED CONTROL
SINGLE POINT SELLUP
SINGLE POINT SELLUP
AUTOMATED Ci'ROL
Z DIFF
SAME
WEEK
-1.281
I DIFF
ACROSS
WEEKS
-18. 421
7.32% 7.51%
-7.61%
14.871
-25.40%
-33.41%
-11.001
19.25n
-17.31
-39.891
-39.39% -24.941
63.42: 31.96%
-9.14% 33.66Z
104.191
2.63n
-3.49%
-39.751
-39.941
38.82!
-13.33%
-27.171
-51.53
-25.rw
-39. 8% -45. 3
-0.03" 12.03
6.7- 0 0.%A
-22.38%
-14.80.
-1G. ;'
-18.66o
Table 5.6: Expanded Sell Up Test Results
week comparison are positive percentages. In general, the automated control flights
outperformed the single point sell up flights on a total coach class revenue basis.
Revenue impact tests were performed on a flight by flight basis to further assess
sell up impact. The incremental revenue test, as in the preliminary study, allows one
to compare flight revenues during the period the sell up policy was implemented,
screening out differences in booking levels not due to sell up. Since the test in-
corporated flights over a two week period, the revenue impact difference, AR, was
determined a bit differently. Also, since the sell up policies implemented varied on
a group basis, the calculation of AR varied. For the markets in Group I, AR was
determined as follows:
0 0
AR = fy ( (by +by W-by1-bj)+fE ( (b8j+ b -B- )
j=7 j=7
0 0
f ( (bs +bg -bc -bij)+ fi ( (byj;+bsj -byj -b j)+j =14 j =14
0 0f ( (b +b - by -bc )+ fK j j
j =42 j =42
0
fL 5 (b1 + bs - bc- b q) (5.2)j = 42
Revenue impact is the sum of the revenue impact differences in Classes "Y" and
"B" from Day 7 to Day 0, Classes "M" and "H" from Day 14 to Day 0, and Classes
"Q". "K" and "L" from Day 42 to Day 0. Revenue comparisons were made between
all four flights in the two week period, for a given flight number. For example, in
the ATLBOS market, Flight A, total revenue impact is the sum of the individual
revenue impact for the sell up flights Weeks 1 and 2 minus that of the control flights
Weeks 1 and 2.
The sell up strategy for markets in Group II varied from that in Group I only
I)y the (lay that Classes "K" and "L" were closed (Day 21 instead of Day 42). Thus,
Equation 5.2 would change only in that j = 42 would be replaced by a j = 21. For
those flights falling into Group III:
0 0
A.R = fy ( (bs 1 + b  - b' - b %)+ fH (bj + Wj- bcj'- bj ) +
j=7 j=7
0 0
fQ (b31 + b b - b)+ fK (b j + b - bc' bj2j =21 j =21
0
fL (b31 + b s - bj- W) (5.3)
j = 21
Since this sell up policy only includes prematurely closing Classes "H", "K" and
"L", the incremental revenue for Classes "B" and "Y" was not determined.
Table 5.7 lists a few examples of the incremental revenue test on a class by class
basis as well as the total revenue impact values for a select group of flights. The net
Ciange in Bookings was determined on an individual class level, depending upon
when the class was affected by the sell up actions. For example, ATLBOS Flight
B in Week 1, had a net change of 51 bookings in "Y" class from Day 7 to Day
0. In some cases, the net change in bookings is negative, which means that the
nuiber of cancellations made during the specific time period measured (which are
negatively valued) offset the number of bookings (positively valued) for the class.
Revenuc Impact for a specific fare class is the change in bookings multiplied by the
average posted fare value for the class. If a negative value is realized for the change
in bookings variable, then the revenue impact is assumed to be zero. The above
example had a revenue impact of $15,543 in Class "Y". Total Revenue Impact for
a specific class is the sum of the revenue impact of the two sell up flights minus the
sum of the revenue impact of the two control flights. If this value is positive, then sell
up has had a positive impact in the specific class. In contrast, if this revenue value
is negative, sell up has had an adverse effect on the class. In the ATLBOS example,
MARKET FLIGHT WEEK OF
NUMBER DEPARTURE
ATLBOS B I SEL:
1 CON
2 CON
2 SELI
MARKET FLIGHT .EEK OF
NUMBER DEPARTURE
DFNATL A I SEL
I CON
2 CON
2 SEL
MAIRKET FLIGHT WEEK OF
NUMBER DEPARTURE
LSAFLL B - 1 SEL
I CON
2 CON
2 SEL
Table 5.7: 1
the total revenue impact for "Y" class was $3,030, and sell up had a positive impact
on "Y" class for Flight B.
The revenue impact of a specific sell up strategy can be measured using Total
Revenue Impact values. For example, the impact of closing "B" class in the ATLBOS
market at Day 7 can be calculated by adding up the Total Revenue Impact of "Y"
and "B" classes. In the case of Flight B, this value is $3,030. One could say that
sell up from "B" to "Y" classes was successful on a revenue basis for this flight.
Total Revenue hnipact of all classes is the sum of the revenue impact differences
in all classes affected by a specific sell up policy. For the ATLBOS market, which
uses the Group I sell up strategy, this is the stun of the revenue impact differences
for Classes "Y" through "L". The total revenue impact for Flight B in this case is
-$5.640. Thus while sell up from "B" class to "Y" class was positively valued, the
sell up strategy as a whole was not successful in terms of revenue impact, due to
the lack of sell up in the lower fare classes.
The Total Revenue Impact of all classes value was positive for only two out of
the twenty-two flight numbers surveyed. In general, sell up appeared to be most
successful from "B" class to "Y" class. This can be seen in Table 5.8, which isolates
the revenue impact of these two classes. Revenue impact was positive for ten out
of the twenty-two flights, when "Y" and "B" classes were considered alone. Sell up
was less successful in the lower fare classes ("H" class to "M" Class as well as "L"
and "K" classes to "Q" class). When considering the revenue impact of "H" and
"M" classes alone, two out of the twenty-two flights had a positive revenue impact.
None of the flights surveyed had a positive revenue impact with respect to "L", "K"
and "Q" classes only.
REVENUE IMPACT MEASUREMENTS
Y AND B FARE CLASSES
- Y CLASS
MARKET FLIGHT REVENUE
IMPfACT
B CLASS
REVENUE
IMPACT
ATL30S
ATLLAX --
LGAATL
MLBA TL
DFWATL
LGAFLL
A TL GSP
GA TL
A T'LB
($4,545)
$%, 030
$2, 352
($4,704)
$16,.038
($4,752)
$1, 442
$0
$1, 360
($2.176)
$2, 064
$0
$ 6, P21 
sZO2
s.3 2p (
$96
L1., 992
($::, 393)
$5, 503
($234)
0
.($3, 641)
$0
($723)
$0
(*$3S, OO)
($608)
($468)
($1, 170)
($3, 444)
($2, 952)
($1, 200)
($1,680)
($2, 270)
($3, 634)
($2,~ 212)
$233
($1. 164)
$0
($'aq120)
($4,779)$3. 03
($1, 239)
($4,704)
$15, 315
($4, 752)
($2, 352)
($608)
$8 4($3.,346)
($1,30
$1, 004
($1, 200)
$4,611
$1,052
($2, 44a)
($1, 81 l
$11 225
($5, 757)
$3,-64
$ 4,38 10
Table 5.8: Revenue Impact Results for "Y" and "B" Classes Only
TOTAL
Appendix C contains graphs of the daily booking information for a select group
of flight/fare class combinations. The first two graphs are of "Y" and "B" class
bookings for ATLGSP Flight B. These graphs typify what happened in those mar-
kets which exhibited successful sell up from Class "B" to "Y". Bookings in Class
"Y" for the sell up flights increase substantially after Day 7, which is when "B"
class was closed. Prematurely closing "B" class did not have an adverse effect on
the sell up flights' booking levels, as can be seen by the second graph.
Graphs of "Y" class booking histories for the GSPATL market follow. Flight A
is a good example of sell up to "Y" class, with both weeks of sell up flights indicating
a jump in bookings from Day 7 to Day 0. Flight B indicates relatively little sell up
in "Y" class when comparing the sell up flights to the control flights. These graphs
indicate the possibility of having sell up exist for one flight and not for another in
the same market.
The following two graphs are of ATLDCA Flight B, indicating an example of
the nonexistence of sell up from Class "H" to Class "M". Most test flights exhibited
this type of behavior in relation to "H" and "M" classes. It can be seen in the graph
of "M" class bookings, that relatively few increases in bookings occur from Day 14
to Day 0 for the sell up flights in comparison to the control flights. Bookings in "H"
class for this particular flight indicate low booking levels for the sell up flights in
comparison to the control flights, whose bookings increased substantially from Day
14 to Day 0. In general, bookings in "H" class were low for the sell up flights, and
this loss was not overcome by an increase of bookings in "M" class, due to the lack
of sell up behavior from "H" to "M" classes.
The final two graphs indicate "typical" booking behavior for "Q" and "K"
classes, represented by BOSATL Flight A. No sell up is indicated from Day 42
to Day 0 in "Q" class for the sell up flights. Booking levels for "K" class sell up
flights are low, due to their premature closing at Day 42. As in the preliminary
study, sell up was not prevalent in these lower fare classes.
One can conclude the following from the expanded sell up study:
1. Sell up is flight specific. It is possible for one flight to exhibit sell up behavior
and another flight in the same market to show no indication of sell up.
2. The sell up strategies tested in this study had an overall negative revenue im-
pact (revenue gained through sell up was less than revenue lost by prematurely
closing out specific fare classes).
3. Comparisons of flights within the same week and across weeks yielded rela-
tively the same negative sell up impact results.
4. Some positive indication of sell up was shown from "B" class to "Y" class. In
general. lower fare classes showed little or no positive sell up impact.
5.2 Price Elasticity Measurements
Section 4.4 describes how price elasticity measures can be obtained from a sell up test
similar to the study described in this section. When a sell up strategy prematurely
closes a fare class, the price of a ticket in that class is essentially being increased
from f, to fme. Elasticity of demand with respect to price can be related to sell
up if a measure can be obtained of the change in demand (or bookings) after the
fare class is closed (change in price).1
1 I eaII Ia ela i c i ty v of dem ai (I wit Ih respect to I lie price of particular fare class is expressetI
e ,, b (
= T :f b* T5.
Using the change in bookings values listed in the incremental revenue tests of
Table 5.7, a proxy for the net change in passengers due to an increase in price can
be obtained (Ab). The measure Af, is simply the measure of the difference in fare
class values hetween class m and class m + 1.
For example, DFWATL Flight A's fare and booking values for sell up from Class
"H" to "M" are as follows:
b1 = 32 b2 = 2
= $153 f2 = $211
Term b1 represents the number of passengers who would have booked in Class "H"
of the sell up flight, had it remained open. It can be approximated by the sum of
the change in bookings for the control flight in Class "H". The term b2 is the net
change in bookings in Class "M" after Day 14 (which is when Class "H" was closed)
between the sell up flight and the control flights.
Elasticity of demand with respect to price for this flight in "H" class, eD,IH
becomes:
(2 -32) 32
eD.fH - = -2.47 (5.5)
D (211 - 153) 153
This value indicates a negatively valued elasticity measure, as expected. Elasticity
for "H" class of this flight is highly elastic, which indicates a weak probability for
sell up, due to price sensitivities of passengers requesting this fare class. This is
consistent with the findings of the revenue impact tests, which indicated relatively
little or no sell up from "H" to "M" classes.
Due to the nature of the sell up strategy imposed, it was only possible to theo-
retically calculate three elasticity measures, esB, CD.H, and eD,fK.L for Groups I
and Groups II, and only the latter two elasticity measures for Group III. Bookings
in "B" class were extremely low, making it difficult to extract the Ab values for
CD.fB. In general, reasonable elasticity measures were only obtained in relation to
"H" and "K,L" classes. These values are listed in Table 5.9. Elasticity for "K,L"
class (which for the purposes of these calculations will be denoted as one class) was
determined by combining bookings in "K" and "L" classes, to obtain b1 and forming
a weighted average of fare values for these two classes in order to come up with a
standard composite fi value.
Elasticity measures for "H" and "K,L" classes are extremely price elastic. This
result coincides with the revenue impact results obtained in the previous section,
which indicated the nonexistence of sell up in these classes. It is unfortunate that
reliable measures of "B" class elasticity could not be obtained. It can be speculated
that thesq elasticities would be between negative one and zero (inelastic) for those
flights which sell up to "Y" class was successful, and more elastic (less than negative
one) for those flights in which sell up to "Y" class was unsuccessful on a revenue
basis.
The elasticity values highlighted in Table 5.9 are uniform in that all are highly
elastic. The values vary, however, on a flight by flight basis. For example, in the
GSPATL market, Flight A and Flight B's elasticities for Class "K,L" differ by an
extremely large amount. The low number of bookings in some classes, particularly
for the sell up flights, leads one to wonder about the accuracy of these elasticity
measures.
In many cases, elasticity values for Class "H" are more negatively valued than
those for Class "KL", which violates the assumption made in Equation 4.19. This
does not make intuitive sense and can be attributed in part to lower booking levels in
Classes "M" and "H" than in Classes "Q" and "K,L". While the elasticity measures
in Table 5.9 are somewhat unreliable due to booking levels, all are consistent in that
they are valued less than negative one and extremely elastic, as expected.
Elasticity values could be extremely useful to an air carrier to aid in identifying
specific markets/flights/fare classes with sell up potential. From this study one can
conclude:
1. Elasticity measures are flight specific, which reinforces the need for sell up
strategies to be tailored to specific flights.
2. It can be speculated that elasticity of demand with respect to price in "B"
class is inelastic for some flights, judging from the results of the revenue impact
tests, but elastic for other flights.
3. Elasticity of demand with respect to price in "H" and "Q" classes is highly
elastic for all flights tested.
FLIGHT
A
B
eD,fH eDfKL
-6.0
-3.9
MARKET
ATLBOS
ATLLAX
LGAATL
MLBATL
DFWATL
LGAFLL
ATLGSP
BOSATL
ATLMLB
GSPATL
ATLDCA
A
B
A -
B -
A -7.3
B -6.5
A -6.6
B -7.2
-2.5
-2.4
-1.6
-4.0
-3.7
-3.3
-1.6
-2.8
-2.5
-3.0
-1.7
-4.4
- -6.1
7.2 -5.4
5.2 -9.8
4.7 -5.8
3.4 -7.9
2.9 -1.4
-2.9
-10.5
-8.7
-12.3
Table 5.9: Price Elasticity Measures for "H" and "K,L" Classes
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A -3.3
B -3.0
A -5.1
B -4.4
A -2.2
B -2.8
A -2.5
B -2.5
A -8.8
B -5.7
-
-
Chapter 6
Conclusions
6.1 Research Findings
This thesis has concentrated on the issue of passenger choice shifts in the airline
reservations and booking process. In particular, the focus has been on the existence
and impact of sell up, or vertical choice shifts. Sell up strategies were developed
and tested in an actual airline environment in order to make an assessment of the
potential benefits and costs of sell up.
Vertical choice shifts nade during the booking process are extremely beneficial
to an air carrier in terms of flight revenues. By "selling up", a passenger is paying
more for a given seat on the same flight originally requested. The question becomes
whether the revenue gained by those who sell up is greater than the revenue lost by
those passengers who decide to explore other flight itineraries. If the revenue gained
offsets the revenue lost, then a sell up strategy has been beneficial to a flight's
revenues.
a
Sell up potential does not exist in all markets or even on all flights in a given
market in which sell up has been identified. In general. flights with historically high
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demand levels will have more instances of selli'i. In these markets, a passenger is
more likely to be denied an initial request and given the opportunity to sell up. A
large probability for sell up exists in fare clfasses of a higher revenue value. Business
travelers, who are more likely to purchase tickets in higher fare classes have a higher
likelihood of selling up due to the nature of their travel. Leisure travelers, who are
more price elastic, will be less likely to sell up. Finally, highly competitive flight
markets will have a lower sell up potential than those which are dominated by only
one or relatively few carriers. Markets which are highly competitive give many travel
options to a passenger, decreasing potential for sell up. In order to take advantage
of sell up opportunities, a carrier should be a fairly dominant carrier in a flight
market.
A selection of test flights in an actual airline environment was made. Sell up
strategies were developed to close down two or more fare classes prematurely in
order to induce sell up behavior. Flights incorporating the sell up strategies were
compared to control flights on a revenue basis in order to test the impact of the
strategies.
On an overall revenue basis, sell up flights were outperformed by the control
flights. Sell up strategies as a whole proved to be unsuccessful in terms of coach
class revenues.
It is important to judge sell up impact on the basis of incremental revenues
rather than on an incremental booking basis. This thesis placed a great emphasis
on the revenue impact test, which served to screen out differences in booking levels
hetween sell up flights and control flights prior to the implementation of the sell up
strategy. Using this test, sell up was found to be almost nonexistent in lower fare
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classes. The only fare classes which showed some positive indication of sell up were
from "B" class to "Y" class, which constitute the two highest fare classes in terms
of fare values. Thus, sell up behavior was most prevalent in the upper fare classes.
Sell up was shown to be very flight specific. It was possible for sell up to exist
for one flight/fare class and not to exist for another flight in the same fare class of
the same city pair. Sell up strategies must be developed on a flight-by-flight basis,
taking into account fluctuations in demands.
Price elasticity measures obtained from sell up booking information also proved
to be flight specific. It was shown that price elasticity of demand for passengers
in lower fare classes is extremely elastic, as expected. Although reliable estimates
were not obtained due to low booking levels, it was speculated that price elasticities
in upper fare classes ("B" and "Y" classes) are inelastic, for certain flights, due to
positive sell up impacts from "B" class to "Y" class.
The following criteria should be met in the development of a successful sell up
strategy:
1. The policy should be developed on a flight by flight basis, taking into account
that sell up is flight specific.
2. Booking limits should be restricted in upper fare classes only, in order to
impose sell up in the higher fare classes.
3. Booking limit restrictions should not be made in lower fare classes, due to lack
of sell up behavior in these classes.
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6.2 Directions for Further Research
More extensive research on sell up opportunities in the airline industry is needed
before sell up can be included in the seat inventory control process. The first step
lies in the ability to properly identify those flight/fare class combinations which have
a high probability for sell up. This thesis has shown that, in general, sell up exists
in higher fare classes and is relatively nonexistent in lower fare classes. The thesis
also indicated that sell up in higher fare classes is not prevalent on all flights.
A tool to properly identify those flights with sell up potential would be bene-
ficial to airlines. One way of doing so would be to estimate a reliable set of sell
up probability values P(v) (probability of a vertical shift), on a fare class/flight
specific basis. These values would be based on historical booking data, adjusted for
seasonality.
Once a reliable set of probability estimators is obtained, the estimators can be
incorporated into a seat inventory control model. Without P(v) values, a seat
inventory control model would find the optimal number of seats to be protected for
each fare class without taking into account sell up opportunities. Including Pi(v)
values would serve to protect more seats for the higher fare classes, in which sell
up is more prevalent. The problem lies in obtaining a reliable set of probability
values. Trying to estimate one for each fare class/flight combination would result in
an unreasonably large number of probability estimators.
Sell up opportunities could also be detected using elasticity estimators, similar
to the elasticity measures obtained in Section 5.2. Flight/fare class combinations
with inelastic price elasticities would have a higher probability of sell up. Once
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again, the difficulty lies in the estimation of these values on a flight specific basis.
Also, due to fluctuations in demand, their reliability can be questioned.
A more general method of identifying flights with sell up potential would be to
somehow formulate a flight specific competitive index. This index would take into
account market share values for each flight in a city-pair market. Every flight would
have an index which would indicate how much competition exists from other carriers
for the specific flight. Those flights which have a large amount of competition would
obviously have a lower sell up potential, since many other options would exist to a
potential passenger. However, those flights which have relatively little competition
from other carriers would naturally have a higher sell up potential. This method
is less complex than Pi(v) estimation or elasticity measurements because it is only
flight specific, not fare class specific. It could be incorporated into a seat inventory
control model as an effective way of identifying flights with sell up potential.
Obviously, much research and testing is necessary in order to obtain an "opti-
mal" model which identifies sell up potential. This thesis has attempted to clarify
the "where" and "when" of the problem. Guidelines have been established for iden-
tifying flights with high sell up potential and fare classes with a high prevalence of
sell up behavior. The solution lies in the determination of the "how".
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Appendix B
Booking Information;
Expanded Study
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DEP. ACTION COACH BOOKINGS BY CLASS
MARKET FLIGHT WEEK TAKEN Y B H H 9 K L TOTAL
ATLESP A SINGLE POINT SELLUP 42 4 3 4 5 16 2 76
1 AUTOMATED CONTROL 46 9 6 3 15 13 9 101
2 AUTOMATED CONTROL 49 8 0 7 12 17 6 99
2 SINGLE POINT SELLUP 61 7 6 1 7 11 4 97
B 1 AUTOMATED CONTROL 29 5 6 16 4 8 16 84
1 SINGLE POINT SELLUP 45 1 0 5 3 3 2 59
2 SINGLE POINT SELLUP 50 2 6 7 4 11 3 83
2 AUTOMATED CONTROL 30 4 8 10 12 12 8 84
BOSATL A 1 AUTOMATED CONTROL 40 18 39 18 29 44 5 193
f SINGLE POINT SELLUP 56 10 18 2 9 16 0 111
2 SINGLE POINT SELLUP 37 10 10 3 11 33 0 104
2 AUTOMATED CONTROL 33 8 27 24 31 44 5 172
B 1 SINGLE POINT SELLUP 47 11 10 2 7 13 3 93
1 AUTOMATED CONTROL 69 18 13 24 25 11 1 161
2 AUTOMATED CONTROL 60 16 12 13 11 11 5 128
2 SINGLE POINT SELLUP 115 3 8 11 15 17 0 169
GSPATL A I SINGLE POINT SELLUP 44 2 6 4 4 1 3 64
1 AUTOMATED CONTROL 34 4 7 14 7 11 7 84
2 AUTOMATED CONTROL 25 1 6 3 10 3 4 52
2 SINSLE POINT SELLUP 76 3 4 0 6 4 0 93
B I AUTOMATED CONTROL 43 6 1 21 10 5 9 95
1 SINGLE POINT SELLUP 59 2 4 2 5 7 4 83
2 SINGLE POINT SELLUP 41 6 4 2 3 6 1 63
2 AUTOMATED CONTROL 62 6 6 8 10 8 2 102
ATLMLE A 1 AUTOMATED CONTROL 12 0 4 18 6 18 20 78
1 SINGLE POINT ZELLUP 11 3 6 3 8 8 2 41
2 SINGLE POINT SELLUP 14 0 2 7 3 20 7 53
2 AUTCMATED CONTROL 19 4 3 19 14 25 9 93
B 1 SINGLE POINT SELLUP 8 3 5 8 7 3 8 42
1 AUTOMATED CONTROL 13 7 0 19 5 18 17 79
2 AUTOMATED CONTROL 16 0 0 15 12 9 30 82
2 SINGLE POINT SELLUP 24 6 1 7 7 16 18 79
ATLOC A 1 SINGLE POINT SELLUP 37 0 3 4 5 8 6 63
1 AUTOMATED CONTROL 26 2 3 12 14 21 4 82
2 AUTOMATED CONTROL 26 3 2 13 15 21 7 87
2 SINGLE POINT SELLUP 43 6 1 1 16 15 5 87
B 1 AUTOMATED CONTROL 70 11 8 18 5 21 12 175
SINGLE FOINT SELLUP 72 14 14 2 9 13 4 122
2 SIN.LE POINT SELLUP 90 6 3 4 10 3 2 118
2 AUTOMATED CONTROL 74 12 5 20 29 19 3 162
Table B.1: Expanded Study, Coach Class Bookings
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DEP.
MARKET FLIGHT WEEK
ACTION
TAKEN
COACH BOOKINGS BY CLASS
Y B M H Q K L TOTAL
ATLBOS A I
1
2
2
B 1
1
2
2
ATLLAX A I
1
2
2
2
2
LGAATL A 1
I
2
B 1
1
2
2
MLSATL A I
2
B 1
I
DFWATL A I
1
2
B 2 ADGFAL A 1I
B i
2
AUTOMATED CONTROL 35
SINGLE POINT SELLUP 33
SINGLE POINT SELLUP 20
AUTOMATED CONTROL 34
SINGLE POINT SELLUP 95
AUTOMATED CONTROL 96
AUTOMATED CONTROL 65
SINGLE POINT SELLUP 54
AUTOMATED CONTROL 47
SINGLE POINT SELLUP 39
SINGLE POINT SELLUP 67
AUTOMATED CONTROL 61
SINGLE POINT SELLUP 39
AUTOMATED CONTROL 45
AUTOMATED CONTROL 50
SINGLE POINT SELLUP 36
SINGLE POINT SELLUP 42
AUTOMATED CONTROL 34
AUTOMATED CONTROL 21
SINGLE POINT SELLUP 79
AUTOMATED CONTROL 89
SINGLE POINT SELLUP 113
SINGLE POINT SELLUP 82
AUTOMATED CONTROL 113
AUTOMPTED CONTROL 11
SINGLE POINT SELLUP 9
SINGLE POINT SELLUP 13
AUTOMATED CONTROL 10
SINGLE POINT SELLUP 13
AUTOMTED CONTROL 17
AUTOMATED CONTROL 23
SINGLE POINT SELLUP 13
SINGLE POINT SELLUP 61
AUTOMATED CONTROL 77
AUTOMATED CONTROL 52
SINGLE POINT SELLUP 78
AUTOMATED CONTROL 87
SINGLE POINT SELLUP 70
SINGLE POINT SELLUP 92
AUTDMATED CONTROL 116
AUTOMATED CONTROL 6
SINSLE POINT SELLUP 9
SINGLE POINT SELLUP 14
AUT2MATED CONTROL 12
SINGLE POINT SELL!P 22
AUTCNATED CONTPCL 36
AUTCMATED CCNTROL 11
3IGLE O:NT 3ELLP 23
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27 3
17 1
48 29
23 15
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57 20
42 3
22 17
15 3
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25 21
28 34
37 37
26 32
24 10
6 6
8 3
1 9
23 4
16 9
38 3
9 0
27 17
12 28
8 4
13 10
25 28
8 7
6 6
6 16
5 5
26 14
58 15
35 21
53 10
37 42
63 11
34 2 1
46 17
42 130
8 56
28 80
23 163
15 59
33 46
39 13
155
86
59
154
206
257
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160
139
163
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205
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118
62
78
73
135
140
172
115
194
88
45
54
93
34
39
63
40
110
204
153
152
255
172
179
261
235
110
149
241
165
144
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BOOKING INFORMATION
ATL.GSP FLIGHT #B. Y CLASS
DAYS OUT
SU.1 0 SU,2 A C.2E CI
ATL-GSP FLIGHT #B. B CLASS
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42 44 46 48 50 52 54 56
- SU.1
DAYS OUT
0 SU.2 a C.2
Figure C.1: ATLGSP "Y", "B" Classes, Flight B
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0 C,1
BOOKING INFORMATION
GSP-ATL FLIGHT #A. Y CLASS
E SU,1
DAYS OUT
+ C,1 0 C,2 A SU.2
GSP-ATL FLIGHT #B. Y CLASS
10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
0 C.1 - SU.1
DAYS OUT
0 SU.2 A C.2
Figure C.2: GSPATL "Y" Class, Flights A, B
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BOOKING INFORMATION
ATL-DCA FLIGHT #B. M CLASS
DAYS OUT
C,1 + SU,1 0 SU,2 A C.2
ATL-DCA FLIGHT 0B. H CLASS
DAYS OUT
SU,1 0 SU.20 C.1 a C,2
Figure C.3: ATLDCA "M", "H" Classes, Flight B
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BOOKING INFORMATION
BOS-ATL FLIGHT #A. Q CLASS
DAYS OUT
0 C.1 + SU.1 o SU,2 A C.2
BOS-ATL FLIGHT #A. K CLASS
DAYS OUT
+ sU,1 o SU.2 a C.2
Figure C.4: BOSATL "Q", "K" Classes, Flight A
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